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6Abstract
The aim of this thesis was to consider the role of appraisals of intrusive 
thoughts in the development of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. A narrative 
literature review explored the hypothesis that ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts lie 
on a continuum with clinical obsessions. The review discussed previous 
research on intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples and drew comparisons 
with characteristics of clinical obsessions. An internet-based empirical 
investigation employed a randomised controlled trial design in order to test 
the effectiveness of an intervention based on normalising information in 
reducing problematic meta-cognitive beliefs.  A large sample (N = 148) of 
young adults (aged 18-20 years) was screened in to the study based on high 
levels of problematic meta-cognitive beliefs. Participants completed 
questionnaire measures of meta-cognitive beliefs, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms, reactions to intrusive thoughts and experiential avoidance. 
Participants completed an interactive quiz based on normalising information 
(experimental condition) or pet information (control condition). Significant 
reductions in problematic meta-cognitive beliefs and experiential avoidance 
were observed in both conditions, thus no additional benefit of normalising 
information was indicated. The implications of these findings are discussed in 
the context of the potential normalising effects of symptom monitoring.  
Overall this thesis supports the comparison of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts and 
obsessions and suggests that negative appraisals, such as problematic meta-
cognitive beliefs, may not be the only defining factor in the development of 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.
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Introduction
The thesis presented here is structured in the alternative ‘paper-based’ format, 
and therefore comprises sections that are in a format suitable for submission 
for publication. This format was chosen as a standard requirement of the 
degree for which it is submitted (Doctor of Clinical Psychology), and has 
allowed the researcher the experience of writing in journal paper formats. 
Two papers are presented that are in a format suitable for submission for 
publication in peer-reviewed academic journals. The first paper presents a 
literature review, which has been formatted for publication in Cognitive 
Therapy and Research. The second paper presents the empirical work 
conducted, and has been formatted for publication in Behaviour Research and 
Therapy. Each paper follows the guidelines of the Publication Manual of the 
American Psychological Association, Sixth Edition, as cited by both journals, 
in addition to extra guidelines specified in the information for authors. A 
reference to each journal is made on the title page of each paper, and the 
guidelines are attached in the appendices (see Appendices 1a and 1b). The 
order of authorship reflects the relative scientific and professional 
contributions of the individuals: the principal contributor appears first, and 
subsequent names are in order of decreasing contribution. The degree 
candidate assumed principal authorship, as the papers are based entirely on 
the work conducted for the thesis; the main supervisor assumed secondary 
authorship.
This thesis explores the role of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts in the 
development of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), by investigating the 
effects of a normalising intervention on meta-cognitive beliefs in a nonclinical 
13
sample. Cognitive theories of OCD give intrusive thoughts a prominent role in 
the development and maintenance of the disorder; this assertion is considered 
in more detail in the literature review presented in paper one of this thesis: 
Obsessive Intrusive Thoughts in the General Population. The review discusses 
previous research on intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples, in order to 
assess whether thoughts similar to clinical obsessions occur in the general 
population. The similarities and differences between intrusive thoughts and 
clinical obsessions are considered and conclusions drawn about the validity of 
the comparison drawn between the two. 
Cognitive theories of OCD claim that the negative appraisals of 
intrusive thoughts lead to the development of the disorder. The second paper 
in this thesis, Normalising Intrusive Thoughts in Young Adults, presents a 
large-scale internet-based study. This study tested the effects of an 
intervention aimed at reducing negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts. The 
intervention was developed based on information about the prevalence of 
intrusive thoughts. Questionnaire measures of meta-cognitive beliefs, 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, emotional and behavioural reactions and 
experiential avoidance, were used to assess the effectiveness of the 
intervention.
The final section of this thesis, the Critical Appraisal, provides a 
discussion of the research presented, including the methodological limitations, 
potential improvements to and implications of this research. The researcher’s 
reflections on the process of conducting the research are included.
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1.1 Abstract
Intrusive thoughts feature as a key factor in our current understanding of 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Cognitive theories of OCD posit that 
the interpretation of normal intrusive thoughts leads to the development and 
maintenance of the disorder. Research that supports the role of beliefs and 
appraisals in maintaining distress in OCD is based on the supposition that 
clinical obsessions are analogous with normal intrusive thoughts. This paper 
reviews research investigating the occurrence of intrusive thoughts in 
nonclinical populations, in order to assess whether these thoughts have 
common features with obsessions. The prevalence of intrusive thoughts with 
obsessive content is assessed, as well as other aspects of these thoughts, such 
as triggers, appraisals and response strategies. Following a critique of 
literature in this field, this paper goes on to discuss the implications for future 
research.
Keywords: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; intrusive thoughts; obsessions.
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Introduction
Intrusive thoughts are central in the current understanding of 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). DSM IV criteria (American 
Psychological Association [APA], 1994) specify recurrent and persistent 
thoughts (verbal, impulses or images), experienced as intrusive and 
inappropriate causing marked anxiety and distress. Cognitive models argue 
that intrusive thoughts contribute to the development and maintenance of 
OCD; these theories dominate our understanding of the disorder, as well as 
the recommended treatment (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence [NICE], 2005). Pioneering research by Rachman and de Silva 
(1978) can be cited as an instigating factor in the development of cognitive 
models of OCD. This questionnaire study investigated the presence of 
“intrusive, unacceptable thoughts and impulses, their frequency and 
dismissibility” (p.233), in a sample of nonclinical individuals and found that 
80% described experiencing intrusive thoughts similar in content and form to 
clinical obsessions. Comparisons with reports from a limited sample of OCD 
patients highlighted differences in frequency, duration and intensity of 
intrusive thoughts. In addition, clinical participants appraised their thoughts as 
less acceptable, less resistible and less dismissible than nonclinical 
participants. The authors concluded that intrusive thoughts that resemble 
clinical obsessions are a common experience for nonclinical individuals. 
Clark and Rhyno (2005) described a severity continuum, whereby obsessions 
represent the extreme variant of intrusive thoughts, distinguished by a number 
of dimensions, for example, frequency, distress, and perceived thought 
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control. Such a continuum hypothesis forms the basis for current cognitive 
models of OCD.
Cognitive theories of OCD converge on the proposition that the 
individual’s understanding of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts is central in the 
development and maintenance of OCD, although they differ on the specific 
interpretation of intrusive thoughts. Rachman (1997, 1998) argued for a 
central role of beliefs that fuse the intrusive thought to the event or action; 
whereas, Salkovskis’ (1985, 1999) theory placed emphasis on the belief that 
one is responsible for harm coming to oneself or others. A meta-cognitive 
understanding of OCD (Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells, 1997) emphasises 
the role of beliefs about the significance of intrusive thoughts, including 
control of cognition and thought-fusion beliefs (as described by Rachman). 
Within each theory, negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts increase the 
salience of the thought, and subsequent attention to and accessibility of the 
thought and related stimuli. In addition, behavioural responses, such as 
neutralization and compulsions, are seen as attempts to reduce the perceived 
threat, responsibility or the occurrence of the thought. However, these 
responses maintain the disorder by preventing disconfirmation of problematic 
beliefs about intrusive thoughts.
Previous research supports the role of interpretations of intrusive 
thoughts in OCD. Correlational studies with nonclinical populations have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between OCD symptoms or 
obsessionality and responsibility appraisals (Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, 
Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995; Pleva & Wade, 2006); thought fusion beliefs 
(Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran & Woody, 1995; Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, 
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Neary, & Brigidi, 2001); and meta-cognitive beliefs (Emmelkamp & 
Aardema, 1999; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). OCD patients have reported 
higher levels of each proposed belief compared to nonclinical controls 
(responsibility, Salkovskis et al., 2000; thought-action fusion, Shafran, 
Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996; meta-cognitive beliefs, Janeck, Calamari, 
Riemann, & Heffelfinger, 2003). Experimental manipulations of thought-
action fusion and of responsibility beliefs have demonstrated increased 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms and behaviour (Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris 
& Spaan, 1999; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Ladouceur, Rhéaume & Aubelt, 
1997; Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, 2007). However, this research is limited to 
the extent that it assumes the validity of the theoretical premise that ‘normal’ 
intrusive thoughts are the “raw material for full obsessions” (p.797, Rachman, 
1997).
In a critique of the appraisal model of OCD  (e.g. Salkovksis, 1985, 
1999), Julien, O’Connor, and Aardema (2007) challenge the assumption that 
the interpretation of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts cause their development into 
obsessions. Julien et al. critique previous literature on the universality of 
intrusive thoughts on the basis of inconsistency in definitions, inconsistent 
methods, and generalization from student populations. The authors concluded 
that the research lacks the necessary consistency to provide strong support for 
the appraisal model of OCD, and recommended further improved research to 
test the model using a consistent and robust methodology. Julien et al. 
critiqued the methodology of research on intrusive thoughts; however, the 
paper lacks a detailed consideration and comparison of the findings from 
previous research. Whilst the weaknesses in the evidence base identified by 
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Julien et al. are acknowledged, the current paper aims to fill this gap by 
providing an up-to-date narrative review of research investigating intrusive 
thoughts in nonclinical populations, in order to assess the accuracy of the 
basic premise of cognitive models of OCD: that intrusive thoughts and 
clinical obsessions lie on a continuum. Additional research since 2007 (eight 
papers) are considered within this review alongside previous work. Research 
findings on the prevalence of intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples are 
considered to assess the assumption that they are a common nonclinical 
experience. A discussion of the nature of intrusive thoughts in nonclinical 
samples, including, themes, triggers, appraisals, and responses, assesses their 
similarity with their proposed clinical counter-parts. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of the similarities and differences between ‘normal’ intrusive 
thoughts and clinical obsessions currently indicated by the research reviewed. 
Differences in the definition of the term ‘intrusive thoughts’ 
throughout the literature are discussed within this review; however, for the 
purposes of this review ‘intrusive thoughts’ refers to cognitions that are 
spontaneous, disruptive, difficult to control and unwanted (Rachman, 1981) 
and may include verbal thoughts, images, or impulses. A review of the 
literature was conducted on 26/11/2010 via web of science and PsycINFO 
databases; search words included intrusive thoughts, nonclinical obsessions, 
and intrusions (full list of search terms in Thesis Appendix 2). The search was 
limited to journal articles written in English, published from 1978 onwards. A 
manual search of the references of each paper, to identify other potential 
papers for inclusion, concluded the search of the literature. Of the resultant 
articles, empirical papers were included if they investigated intrusive thoughts 
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within a nonclinical sample in the theoretical context of OCD. This resulted in 
a total of 35 research papers. 
1.2 Prevalence of Nonclinical Intrusive Thoughts
Since 1978, a number of questionnaire studies have aimed to replicate 
the findings of Rachman and de Silva (1978) and demonstrate that intrusive 
thoughts are a common nonclinical experience. A similar methodology has 
required nonclinical participants to endorse intrusive thoughts from a list. 
Salkovskis and Harrison (1984) used the questionnaire from Rachman and de 
Silva to confirm that 88% of a sample of nonclinical individuals endorsed at 
least one intrusive thought. Purdon and Clark (1993) and Belloch, Morillo, 
Lucero, Cabedo, and Carrió (2004) similarly reported that 99% of their 
nonclinical samples (N = 293, N = 336 respectively) reported ever 
experiencing at least one specific obsession-like intrusive thought listed in the 
Obsessive Intrusions Inventory (OII/ROII), which defines intrusive thoughts 
as egodystonic (in conflict with person’s self-image). These items were drawn 
from the clinical literature and from intrusive thoughts reported by a 
nonclinical pilot sample (Purdon & Clark, 1993). However, it is worth noting 
that in the development of the final OII 16 items were excluded because less 
than 25% of a nonclinical sample endorsed these thoughts. Therefore the 
questionnaire was biased toward thoughts already commonly reported by 
nonclinical individuals, which suggests that the 99% reported in these two 
studies may be an overestimate.
In another item endorsement study by Langlois, Freeston, and 
Ladouceur (2000a), all participants indicated either a frequent or best 
representative intrusive thought. Two clinicians rated how typical of an 
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obsession each thought was: 74% of intrusive thoughts reported by this 
nonclinical sample were rated as clearly recognisable as an obsessive intrusive 
thought (items related to aggression, checking and sexuality). More recently 
Rassin, Cougle, and Muris (2007) investigated the classification of intrusive 
thoughts as ‘obsession-like’. Nonclinical participants endorsed fewer clinical 
obsessions (12.2% from a list reported by OCD patients) than nonclinical 
obsessions (29.1% from a list taken from Rachman & de Silva, 1978); 
endorsement of clinical obsessions was positively associated with 
obsessionality (measured by the Padua Inventory). The data from this study 
reflects the variation in endorsement of intrusive thoughts, but the paper did 
not report statistics on how many participants overall reported their 
occurrence (i.e. prevalence). The findings provide support for the occurrence 
of obsessions in nonclinical populations, but suggest that thoughts with a 
clinical origin are less commonly experienced.
The method of endorsement of thoughts from a list fails to take 
account of individual differences in the content of intrusive thoughts; 
however, idiosyncratic thoughts have also been considered. Freeston, 
Ladouceur, Thibodeau, and Gagnon (1991) included space for idiosyncratic 
thoughts on the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ) and the Intrusive 
Thoughts Questionnaire (ITQ); similar to rates reported in studies using the 
OII (Purdon & Clark, 1993; Belloch et al., 2004), 99% of participants in this 
study reported experiencing at least one intrusive thought in the past month. 
In studies of self-reported intrusive thoughts over a two-week period, high 
prevalence rates have been reported: 83.5% (England & Dickerson, 1988) and 
93% (Wells & Morrison, 1994) of nonclinical participants reported at least 
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one intrusive thought. However, other studies that have screened thoughts 
reported by nonclinical participants have reported much lower rates: Clark 
and Purdon (2009) considered only 41% of idiosyncratic intrusive thoughts to 
be obsessional in nature (rated by two researchers); Trinder and Salkovksis
(1994) screened in only 56% of respondents to a study on thought 
suppression, based on criteria of experiencing intrusive thoughts in the 
previous month. There are marked differences in the figures obtained using 
item endorsement on a questionnaire compared to idiosyncratic intrusive 
thoughts, but also within each method.
The wide range in possible prevalence rates of intrusive thoughts in 
nonclinical participants (41% to 100% in the research discussed) could be a 
product of differences in methodology, including differences in the definition 
of intrusive thoughts as well as the criteria for ‘obsessive’. Definitions have 
been broad, such as “unpleasant, unwanted thoughts” (p.550, Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984) and specific, such as “repetitive, upsetting and unwanted 
thoughts, images or impulses that suddenly appear in consciousness and are 
considered irrational, unrealistic, foreign to one’s character, and difficult to 
control” (p.715, Purdon & Clark, 1993). In addition, the different measures 
that list intrusive thoughts include different themes, for example, the CIQ 
(Freeston et al., 1991; used by Langlois et al., 2000a) assesses cognitions 
around personal health, an embarrassing or painful experience, personally 
unacceptable sexual behavior, verbal aggression, friend or family suffering 
from a fatal disease, and friend or family having an accident. In contrast, the 
OII (Purdon & Clark, 1993; used by Belloch et al., 2004) covers thoughts of 
sex, aggression, dirt and contamination. Differences in definition and 
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measurement have resulted in disagreement about the prevalence of intrusive 
thoughts in the literature.
The time frame of assessment has also varied between studies: 
participants have been asked about intrusive thoughts that have ever occurred 
(e.g. Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; Purdon & Clark, 1993; Rassin, Cougle, & 
Muris, 2007), occurred within the last month (e.g. Freeston et al., 1991) and 
within a two week period (e.g. England & Dickerson, 1988). Different time 
frames mean that the research findings represent relative frequency of 
intrusive thoughts, as well as an estimate of prevalence. Frequency is a 
potential key difference between clinical and nonclinical intrusive thoughts 
(Clark & Rhyno, 2005): In a direct comparison of nonclinical and OCD 
patients using the OII, Morillo, Belloch, and García-Soriano (2007) reported 
significantly more intrusive thoughts experienced by the OCD group; further 
analysis confirmed that this was due to re-experiencing rather than greater 
variety of intrusions. These findings highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between the experience of intrusive thoughts and the regularity 
of that experience.
The inconsistencies in methodology make it difficult to draw specific 
conclusions on the prevalence of obsessive intrusive thoughts in the general 
population; tighter constraints in terms of definition of intrusive thoughts, 
timeframe of assessment, and themes assessed are necessary. A consensus on 
a definition of intrusive thoughts is required in order to establish how 
prevalent such thoughts are in the general population. Consideration of the 
nature of intrusive thoughts and their similarities and differences with 
obsessions will be essential in the development of such a specific definition, 
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as well as in the assessment of the proposed continuum between the two. 
Previous research on intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples has drawn 
comparisons with clinical obsessions on specific features, including themes in 
content, triggers, appraisals and response strategies. The current paper will 
now consider this research in order to assess the comparability of intrusive 
thoughts and obsessions; the literature is discussed in terms of themes, 
triggers, appraisals, and response strategies. Some studies are detailed in more 
than one area.
1.3 Themes
In a study of thought suppression in OCD, Rutledge (1998) asked participants 
to report personal unwanted and repetitive intrusive thoughts; the results 
included a description of the themes of thoughts rated as unpleasant: 
current/past romantic relationship (23.9%), death of or injury to self or other 
(20.2%); academic performance (17.4%) and money (10.1%). This study is 
discussed and placed within the context of OCD; however, the themes of the 
reported intrusive thoughts are not commonly considered as obsessional. This 
could be a result of the broad definition of intrusive thoughts employed, 
which did not specify an obsessive component.
Purdon and Clark (1993, 1994, 2001) used the OII to limit their 
research to intrusive thoughts with obsessional content (Purdon & Clark, 
1993); intrusive thoughts in this measure cover themes of sex, aggression, 
accidents, dirt, disease and contamination. Purdon and Clark (1994) reported 
that items often selected as most upsetting included: running car off the road 
(6%); leaving heat or stove on thereby causing an accident (10%); having sex 
with an unacceptable person (11%); engaging in activity contrary to one’s 
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sexual preference (8%). Purdon and Clark (2001) similarly reported that the 
same items were most often selected as most upsetting, in addition to thoughts 
of self-harm. Clark, Purdon, and Byers (2000) reported the most upsetting 
sexual and non-sexual intrusive thoughts in a student sample using the OII. 
Non-sexual items most often selected as most upsetting included: ‘leaving the 
house without doing something important to prevent burglary or accident’ 
(accident); ‘when using a sharp object that I will slit my wrist or throat or 
otherwise harm myself’ (harm); ‘saying something rude or insulting to others’ 
(aggression). The most upsetting sexual items included ‘being sexually 
victimised’; ‘having sex in public’; ‘engaging in a sexual act with someone 
who is unacceptable to me because they have authority over me’. The findings 
from these three studies suggest that the most upsetting intrusive thoughts for 
nonclinical individuals relate to harm, accident or sex, but not disease and 
contamination. However, Belloch et al. (2004) reported that items from the 
OII most often selected as most upsetting included contamination, as well as 
accidents, harm and sex. Belloch et al. also reported the frequency of intrusive 
thoughts: The ten items reported to occur most frequently related to themes of 
accident, harm, sex and aggression; the top three items related to uncertainty. 
The least frequently occurring items related to aggression (to self and others) 
and bizarre contamination. 
The content of thoughts commonly reported by nonclinical samples 
across studies fall broadly into themes of unacceptable sex, accidents, harm to 
self and aggression toward others. Nonclinical participants less commonly 
report thoughts of dirt, disease and contamination. Perhaps this suggests 
something unique about these thoughts, either that they are not prevalent in 
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the general population, or that they are not considered distressing and so are 
underreported. The former hypothesis is supported by findings from Purdon 
and Clark (1993) and Belloch et al. (2004): both studies found that thoughts of 
disease and contamination, along with more violent thoughts, were less 
frequently endorsed by a nonclinical sample.
The studies discussed in this section have reported a wide range in the 
endorsement of most upsetting intrusive thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2001; 
Belloch et al., 2004), for example, Purdon and Clark (1994) reported that 45 
out of 52 items on the OII were endorsed by their nonclinical sample. 
Consistent with these findings, Clark and Claybourn (1997) reported a mean 
score on the OII of 47.86, and a standard deviation of 35.82, reflecting the 
variation in responses. These findings suggest considerable individual 
differences in the content of intrusive thoughts and in emotional reactions to 
them, which merits further research. Previous research suggests a link 
between the variance in intrusive thoughts experienced by the individual and 
anxiety (Niler & Beck, 1989). Future research may help to clarify the 
between- and within-participant variations in intrusive thoughts and the
relationship between such variations and obsessionality.
1.4 Triggers
Lee and Kwon (2003) proposed two types of obsessional intrusive thoughts, 
differentiated by their trigger. Autogenous intrusive thoughts are ‘out of the 
blue’, with a symbolic or less than logical connection with stimuli, e.g. sexual, 
aggressive and immoral thoughts; reactive intrusive thoughts are more 
logically linked to stimuli, e.g. thoughts about contamination, accidents and 
symmetry. Lee and Kwon argued that the trigger of an intrusive thought 
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determines the consequent appraisals and control strategies used. Autogenous 
thoughts are appraised in terms of control and importance, and subsequently 
avoidance and thought control are employed. Reactive intrusive thoughts are 
appraised in terms of responsibility and subsequently control behaviours or 
compulsions are employed. Responses on the OII from nonclinical individuals 
and OCD patients supported this distinction (Lee & Kwon, 2003; Lee, Kwon, 
Kwon, & Telch, 2005). 
Julien, O’Connor, and Aardema (2009) reported findings from a 
comparison of reports from nonclinical and clinical individuals that suggest 
that autogenous intrusive thoughts are more common in OCD. Participants 
reported the frequency of intrusive thoughts from a list, which originated from 
clinical populations. For the three intrusive thoughts rated as most disturbing, 
participants then rated the link between the thought and the context as either 
directly linked, indirectly linked or no link. Nonclinical individuals were more 
likely to report that their most disturbing intrusion was directly linked to the 
context of its occurrence (approximately half, with one third indirectly 
linked), whereas clinical individuals were more likely to report an indirect 
link (approximately half, with one third directly linked). The authors 
concluded that this difference in trigger presents a challenge for the 
continuum hypothesis, as it suggests that nonclinical and clinical intrusive 
thoughts differ. However, the validity of this conclusion is uncertain, as 
significance analysis of the differences in the total number of types of links 
between groups was not possible (due to the limitations of Chi-square 
analysis).
28
The results from Lee and Kwon (2003) and Julien et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that nonclinical individuals experience both hypothesised types 
of intrusive thoughts. However, the proportions reported by Julien et al. differ 
from previous findings: Parkinson and Rachman (1981) reported that 69% 
nonclinical intrusive thoughts had identifiable triggers; Rachman and de Silva 
(1978) reported that 55% of clinical obsessions had identifiable triggers. It 
may be that a greater proportion of intrusive thoughts without an identifiable 
trigger or a logical connection to the context contribute to the development of 
OCD. In support of this idea, Parkinson and Rachman (1981) found that less 
frequent ‘spontaneous’ intrusive thoughts were reported to be more 
tormenting, discomforting and anxiety-provoking. Further research is needed 
to clarify the difference in reported triggers of nonclinical intrusive thoughts 
and clinical obsessions, and whether this is a distinguishing difference, which 
may consequently impact appraisal and response.
1.5 Appraisal
Appraisal is the way in which meaning is attached to intrusive thoughts 
(OCCWG, 1997), which may be influenced by a general enduring belief style 
about mental events (e.g. meta-cognitive beliefs). Cognitive models 
emphasise the role of the appraisal of intrusive thoughts in the development 
and maintenance of OCD; analogue studies with nonclinical samples have 
assessed the link between appraisals and other factors implicated in the 
development of OCD, such as frequency of intrusive thoughts and emotion.
Questionnaire studies have correlated appraisals of perceived 
dismissibility and control of intrusive thoughts with increased frequency and 
emotion. Dismissibility has been positively correlated with distress and 
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frequency of intrusive thoughts (Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984), anxiety and 
guilt (Niler & Beck, 1989). Perceived control has been positively correlated 
with frequency of intrusive thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 1994), perceived 
consequences of the thought (Clark, Purdon, & Wang, 2003), unpleasantness 
of the thought (Belloch et al., 2004), and obsessionality (Clark et al., 2003). 
Appraisal of intrusive thoughts in terms of control over cognition has also 
been linked to the beliefs implicated in the development of OCD, such as 
thought-action fusion and responsibility. Clark et al. (2000) found that 
thought-action fusion positively correlated with perceived control of both 
sexual and non-sexual intrusive thoughts. Purdon and Clark (1994) reported 
that uncontrollability and frequency were associated with responsibility 
appraisals; furthermore, in the development of the CIQ, Freeston Ladouceur, 
Thibodeau, and Gagnon (1992) reported that the evaluation of intrusive 
thoughts (interpreted by the authors as a responsibility appraisal), predicted 
dysphoria, and uniquely predicted compulsive activity.
Appraisals of intrusive thoughts in terms of their egodystonic nature 
have also been considered characteristic of obsessive thoughts, and key in 
causing distress; these appraisals have been linked to frequency of intrusive 
thoughts and distress in nonclinical samples. In a questionnaire study, Clark 
and Claybourn (1997) found that the belief that the thought may mean 
something about one’s personality best predicted frequency of intrusive 
thoughts; Langlois et al. (2000b) correlated egodystonic appraisals with 
stronger emotions about intrusive thoughts. Egodystonia has been linked to 
the interpretation of intrusive thoughts: Teachman, Woody, and Magee (2006) 
reported that interpretations of intrusive thoughts were negatively affected by 
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an experimental manipulation to appraise the thought as meaning something 
about one’s values. Corcoran and Woody (2008) reported that imagining an 
intrusive thought as the participant’s own or that of their friend did not alter 
appraisals of the personal meaning of the thought; however, increased 
frequency of the same intrusive thought increased the strength of those 
appraisals. Therefore an intricate link between appraisals of intrusive 
thoughts, frequency and distress has been implicated by studies with 
nonclinical samples.
The research findings demonstrate that nonclinical individuals can 
interpret their intrusive thoughts in terms of the beliefs and appraisals 
implicated by theories of OCD. Consistent links between appraisals and 
frequency of intrusive thoughts support the hypothesised quantitative 
differences and the presence of a continuum between clinical and nonclinical 
intrusive thoughts. However, there has been variation in the appraisals linked 
to frequency of intrusive thoughts: the following appraisals have all been 
found to predict frequency of intrusive thoughts: dismissibility (Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984), guilt (Niler & Beck, 1989), uncontrollability, and belief that 
the thought could come true/responsibility (Purdon & Clark, 1994; Belloch et 
al., 2004), perceived consequences (Clark et al., 2003), worry the thought may 
mean something about one’s personality (Clark & Claybourn, 1997). Studies 
comparing nonclinical groups with OCD patients shed some light on the 
potential key appraisals. Morillo, Belloch, and García-Soriano (2007) reported 
quantitative differences in responsibility (worry the thought will come true) 
and control (importance of control and uncontrollabililty) appraisals, such that
OCD patients appraised their intrusive thoughts more frequently in this 
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manner than nonclinical individuals. The OCCWG (2001, 2005) developed 
the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ) and Interpretation of Intrusions 
Inventory (III) with both nonclinical and clinical samples. Higher scores in the 
OCD group demonstrated quantitative differences in general assumptions 
(overestimation of threat, tolerance of uncertainty, importance of thoughts, 
control of thoughts, responsibility and perfectionism) and specific appraisals 
relating to the importance of thoughts, control of thoughts and responsibility. 
Consistent differences in appraisals of responsibility, uncontrollability and 
importance of intrusive thoughts suggest that these may be a key difference 
between nonclinical intrusive thoughts and obsessions. Future research should 
aim to replicate these findings and explicitly link different appraisals with 
frequency of intrusive thoughts and symptoms. The effects of different 
appraisals on measures of frequency, distress and symptoms should be 
considered to assess which is important in the development of OCD. 
Alternatively, as suggested by the meta-cognitive theory, the division of these 
appraisals may turn out to be arbitrary, and rather the important factor may be 
underlying beliefs about mental processes.
Appraisals have also been linked to the response strategies that 
nonclinical individuals engage in following an intrusive thought, such as 
thought suppression, which are hypothesised to have a maintaining role in 
OCD (e.g. Salkovskis, 1999). Therefore, consideration of the association 
between appraisals and response strategies is important in the comparison of 
nonclinical intrusive thoughts with clinical obsessions. Research findings 
linking suppression and responsibility in particular have been mixed. Purdon 
and Clark (2001) found that suppression of obsessional intrusive thoughts 
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increased subsequent discomfort, but did not affect frequency of intrusive 
thoughts or appraisals of pleasantness and responsibility. Marcks and Woods 
(2007) manipulated thought suppression and responsibility appraisals, which 
increased intrusive thought frequency over a 5-minute period; in addition, 
positive correlations between suppression and responsibility appraisal 
contradicted the findings of Purdon and Clark. Suppression was also related to 
a stronger urge to neutralise, increased anxiety and guilt, and increased 
perceived likelihood of the thought coming true. Further consideration of 
response strategies to intrusive thoughts in nonclinical individuals is 
important in consideration of the similarities between intrusive thoughts and 
clinical obsessions. 
1.6 Response strategies
Response strategies used by nonclinical individuals have been compared to 
OCD populations. Previous research has demonstrated that the most 
commonly selected response by nonclinical individuals is a reasoning 
strategy, to reason with the self and prove that the thought is irrational (22%, 
Purdon & Clark, 1994; Clark et al., 2000). Furthermore, no differences in 
response strategy have been found between high and low obsessors (Purdon & 
Clark, 1994), which suggests that clinical and nonclinical populations may use 
similar strategies.
Previous research has investigated the factors that determine the 
selection of response strategy. Clark et al. (2000) demonstrated that non-
sexual intrusive thoughts prompted the use of cognitive and behavioural 
distraction, reassurance seeking and thought stopping more than sexual 
intrusive thoughts; the authors concluded response strategy may be selected 
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on the basis of the content of the intrusion. Langlois et al. (2000b) 
demonstrated that appraisal also determines response strategy: 
escape/avoidance strategies were accounted for by appraisals of egodystonia, 
whereas, problem-focussed strategies (including neutralisation and 
reassurance seeking) were accounted for by appraisals of the reality of the 
intrusive thought. Clark and Purdon (2009) similarly linked appraisals to 
response strategy: common reasons for the dismissal of intrusive thoughts 
were that they were ‘immoral/unethical’ and ‘inconsistent with ideal self’.
Freeston et al. (1991) also found evidence of the use of 
escape/avoidance strategies by nonclinical individuals. In this questionnaire 
study, participants reported their use of response strategies from three 
categories: avoidance/escape (40% of participants), thinking attentively 
(36%), and doing nothing  (24%). Freeston et al. (1991) correlated these 
clusters with aspects of intrusive thoughts: In comparison to the ‘do nothing’ 
strategies, participants who engaged in avoidance reported increased mood 
difficulties (sadness, worry and guilt), and disapproval of the thought; those 
who engaged in ‘attentive thinking’ strategies reported more frequent and 
more varied forms of intrusive thoughts. The authors concluded that appraisal 
of intrusive thoughts determines a response style of avoidance or 
confrontation.
Effortful strategies also include thought suppression, which has been 
linked to the maintenance of OCD (e.g. Salkovskis, 1999). In a detailed 
analysis of control strategies used with intrusive thoughts, Clark and Purdon 
(2009) found that suppression was correlated with obsessional symptoms; the 
authors concluded that processes similar to those in clinical obsessions exist 
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in nonclinical intrusive thoughts. However, experimental studies of thought 
suppression have demonstrated mixed results. Rutledge (1998) asked 
participants to report the frequency of personal intrusive thoughts before, 
during and after the instruction to suppress those thoughts. Gender differences 
were observed: obsessionality was positively correlated with an enhancement 
effect (immediate increase in thought frequency) of thought suppression on 
intrusive thought frequency for females; however, obsessionality was 
negatively correlated with an enhancement effect of thought suppression for 
males. Rebound effects (post-suppression increase in thought frequency) were 
not related to obsessionality. The author suggested that the use of more 
ruminative strategies by females, compared to distraction strategies used by 
males, accounts for gender differences. In a similar experimental 
manipulation, Trinder and Salkovksis (1994) reported that thought 
suppression increased the frequency of personal negative intrusive thoughts 
and discomfort over a four day period compared to ‘think through’, or 
‘mentioning’; however, the longitudinal design precludes the analysis of 
enhancement and rebound effects. The research on thought suppression 
effects is currently inconclusive; inconsistencies may be due to gender 
differences, as highlighted by Rutledge (1998), or individual differences. In 
response to thought suppression instructions, participants may engage in any 
number of strategies, therefore future research could clarify individual 
differences in strategies used to suppress intrusive thoughts.
Another effortful response strategy related to OCD is neutralising. 
Salkovskis et al. (1997) compared the effects of participants’ own neutralising 
to distraction (counting backwards mentally) in response to nonclinical 
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participants’ most common unpleasant intrusive thought; findings provided 
support for the maintaining role of neutralising in OCD, as participants in the 
neutralising condition reported higher levels of discomfort.
Effortful strategies linked to OCD appear to be commonly used by 
nonclinical individuals. These response strategies have been linked to 
appraisals of intrusive thoughts, mood and frequency of intrusive thoughts, as 
well as obsessionality, which supports the comparison of intrusive thoughts 
with clinical obsessions. In specific comparisons of nonclinical and OCD 
groups quantitative differences have been observed in reported response 
strategies: Morillo, Belloch, and García-Soriano (2007) reported that similar 
strategies were endorsed on the OII, but that OCD patients were more likely 
to engage in specific strategies of overt neutralising, reasoning with self, 
seeking reassurance, suppression, saying a prayer, and reassuring myself.
Furthermore, differences have been observed between clinical and nonclinical 
samples in the effects of specific response strategies. Janeck and Calamari 
(1999) confirmed that suppression of intrusive thoughts resulted in a higher 
frequency of intrusive thoughts and greater associated distress in a clinical 
group compared to a nonclinical group. Consistent with this finding, Najmi, 
Riemann, and Wegner (2009) reported greater distress following thought 
suppression in an OCD group compared to a nonclinical group; in addition, 
OCD patients reported significantly more intrusive thoughts overall compared 
to the nonclinical group.
Previous research on response strategies provides further support for 
the continuum hypothesis of intrusive thoughts, as similar strategies are 
engaged in by nonclinical individuals as by individuals with OCD, but with 
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quantitative differences. The differential effects of response strategies for 
nonclinical and clinical samples support the idea of a maintaining role of such 
strategies in cognitive theories of OCD. Future research is required to 
determine if there are strategies that nonclinical individuals use, which are 
protective against obsessionality. This may help to clarify possible differences 
between the response of nonclinical individuals and OCD patients to intrusive 
thoughts.
1.7 Conclusions
Intrusive thoughts are hypothesised to be similar to clinical obsessions, with
the defining difference being degree not kind (Clark & Rhyno, 2005); the 
literature reviewed supports this hypothesis. Clinical obsessions are 
experienced in greater frequencies (re-experienced) to their nonclinical 
counter-parts, which supports a continuum of quantitative difference. 
However, additional differences in content, appraisals and response were 
identified. Clinical obsessions are more violent/aggressive and bizarre 
compared to nonclinical intrusive thoughts and may be experienced as more 
spontaneous (occurring in isolation of explicit triggers). As hypothesised in 
cognitive theories of OCD, clinical individuals are more likely to appraise 
intrusive thoughts in terms of responsibility and control, which has been 
linked to distress and frequency of intrusive thoughts. Although similar 
effortful response strategies were reported by clinical and nonclinical 
individuals (e.g. avoidance), clinical individuals are more likely to engage in 
them and to be distressed as a consequence. Observed differences in 
frequency suggest that clinical individuals re-experience their intrusive 
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thoughts in greater frequency than nonclinical samples, which is associated 
with increased distress, negative appraisals, and effortful responses. 
The differences between intrusive thoughts and clinical obsessions 
observed in previous research have led some authors to speculate that they 
may be distinct phenomenon, undermining support for the continuum. Belloch 
et al. (2004) suggested that intrusive thoughts and clinical obsessions are 
different cognitive experiences, based on their finding that violent, aggressive 
and bizarre contamination intrusive thoughts were not selected by nonclinical 
individuals. Belloch et al. recognised that the thoughts were similar in theme, 
and difficult to differentiate, and subsequently concluded that the differences 
between intrusive thoughts and clinical obsessions are “mystical” (p.2803). 
Julien et al. (2009) similarly asserted that intrusive thoughts are distinct from 
clinical obsessions, on the basis of the finding that a greater proportion of 
intrusive thoughts experienced by clinical individuals do not have a direct link 
to the context in which they occur. Freeston et al. (1991) suggested that 
response strategy may define types of intrusive thoughts and that thoughts that 
prompt avoidance are akin to obsessions. The imposition of this criterion 
could alter the prevalence of intrusive thoughts observed in nonclinical 
samples (40% using avoidance in Freeston et al., 1991) and challenge the 
assumption that they are a common experience in nonclinical samples. Future 
research should aim to clarify whether trigger, content or response to intrusive 
thoughts does in fact distinguish types and whether these differ for clinical 
and nonclinical experiences. In addition, further investigation may be required 
to clarify the role of what comes before and after the thought in defining that 
thought as intrusive or obsessive.
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The observed differences in content and trigger offer a challenge to a 
continuum hypothesis based only on frequency. However, these differences 
could be considered as another continuous aspect of the experience of 
intrusive thoughts. The theme of intrusive thoughts is similar between clinical 
and nonclinical individuals, suggesting that the difference in content is one of 
degree. In addition, the experience of intrusive thoughts without a direct link 
to context are experienced by nonclinical individuals (one third of thoughts 
were reported to have an indirect link; Julien et al, 2009), albeit less 
commonly than in nonclinical individuals. Therefore the observed differences 
between intrusive thoughts and clinical obsessions in previous literature may 
suggest that a more complex continuum of experience exists, and necessitate a 
revision of this hypothesis.
An important task for future research is to elucidate the defining 
differences between nonclinical and clinical obsessive intrusive thoughts, and 
to investigate the possibility that it may not be one specific factor, but rather a 
combination. Morillo, Belloch, and García-Soriano (2007) concluded that the 
defining difference between clinical and nonclinical intrusive thoughts is re-
experiencing of thoughts, which consequently determines the subjective 
experience of the thought and the level of interference in daily living.
Alternatively, obsessions may differ on a number of dimensions to intrusive 
thoughts, and it is the combination of these that contributes to the 
development of OCD. In addition, the direction of cause and effect is 
currently unclear; differences between intrusive thoughts and clinical 
obsessions may be products of OCD rather than contributing to the 
development of the disorder. Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon, and 
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Rygwall (2006) conducted a prospective study of expectant parents, who were 
assessed prenatal and postpartum, as this is thought to be a time of increased 
OCD symptoms. In this study, Abramowitz et al. confirmed that dysfunctional 
beliefs (Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire) held at the prenatal stage predicted 
severity of OCD symptoms, (Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale) at 
postpartum stage. Thus, parents with beliefs that intrusive thoughts are 
significant and threatening were more likely to have severe obsessive 
compulsive symptoms, to a mild clinical level. The authors concluded that 
dysfunctional beliefs about ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts are risk factors for the 
development of OCD.  In a similar prospective study of a student sample, 
Myers, Fisher, and Wells (2009) demonstrated that meta-cognitive beliefs 
predicted obsessive-compulsive symptoms at three-month follow-up. Further 
longitudinal studies could clarify the key factors in the development of 
intrusive thoughts into clinical obsessions.
Addressing the limitations of the reviewed research will help to further 
our understanding of intrusive thoughts. The body of research may be biased 
toward the assumption that intrusive thoughts do occur in nonclinical 
populations: questionnaires assessing appraisals, etc., which assume the 
presence of intrusive thoughts, could be leading for participants; other studies 
have only included participants who reported frequent or distressing intrusive 
thoughts. Such methodological biases may exaggerate the evidence for the 
comparability of intrusive thoughts with obsessions, and thus limit our 
understanding of the prevalence and nature of intrusive thoughts in the 
nonclinical population. Future qualitative research may provide more 
information on the experience of intrusive thoughts in nonclinical individuals. 
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Such research may also clarify and refine a consistent definition of intrusive 
thoughts, which is lacking in previous research. 
It is essential for future research that a clear consensus on the 
definition of intrusive thoughts is reached, which distinguishes them from
other negative cognitions. A detailed consideration of the definition of 
intrusive thoughts, and comparison to other unwanted cognitions, has already 
been made within the literature (Berry, Andrade, May and Kavanagh, under 
review; Clark & Rhyno, 2005). Intrusive thoughts have been described as 
similar to rumination and worry as unwanted forms of cognition that disrupt 
ongoing activity and cause distress; but are distinguished from these long 
elaborative cognitive processes, as brief cognitive experiences. Comparisons 
have also been drawn between intrusive thoughts and negative automatic 
thoughts; Clark and Rhyno (2005) have considered both to be spontaneous, 
but negative automatic thoughts are distinguished as “longer, more elaborative 
chains of evaluative thought” (p.18). Berry, Andrade, May and Kavanagh 
(under review) consider a possible overlap between the two types of 
cognitions, suggesting that some initial negative automatic thoughts may be 
intrusive thoughts, which then lead to subsequent elaboration. Thus there is 
potential for intrusive thoughts to be confused with other forms of cognition, 
and future research requires consideration of specific distinguishing features 
of intrusive thoughts and appropriately targeted assessment. 
Intrusive thoughts are not unique to OCD, and have been implicated 
within other clinical disorders, such as Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), 
Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; Brewin, 1998; Green, 
2003; Watkins, 2004). Berry, Andrade, May and Kavanagh (under review) 
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propose a Transdiagnostic Model of intrusive thoughts, which argues that 
similar cognitive processes are involved across clinical disorders. According 
to this model, the experience of an intrusive thought is interpreted as 
meaningful, thus capturing attentional processes, and leading to subsequent 
elaboration. Cognitive processes involving attention and accessibility increase 
the likelihood of the intrusive thought being re-experienced, and with 
increased automaticity. The research on intrusive thoughts across disorders, 
and the Transdiagnostic Model proposed by Berry et al. highlights the 
importance of specificity when studying obsessive intrusive thoughts. An 
important question for future research is what defines an obsessive intrusive 
thought? or what factors lead to the development of OCD as opposed to other 
disorders in which intrusive thoughts are characteristic? Other cognitive 
processes reviewed in the current paper may also be considered as 
transdiagnostic, for example thought suppression as a response to cognitive 
experiences (within GAD, phobias and depression: Becker, Rinck, Roth & 
Margraf, 1998; Muris, De Jongh, Merckelbach, Postema & Vet, 1998; 
Kuyken & Brewin, 1995), and negative appraisals, including meta-cognitions 
(within GAD, PTSD, and psychosis; Wells & Papageorgiou; 1998; Holeva, 
Tarrier, & Wells, 2001; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). One possible aspect 
that may distinguish intrusive thoughts between disorders is theme or content; 
specific obsessive content of intrusive thoughts, in combination with 
transdiagnostic processes, could determine the development of OCD. The 
suggestion that some cognitive processes are similar across disorders adds 
further weight to the call for a clear and concise definition of obsessive 
intrusive thoughts, which distinguishes them from intrusive thoughts in other 
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disorders on the important features. Such a definition requires extensive 
consideration of the processes that overlap between clinical disorders, and 
those that define the development of one disorder over the other.
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2.1 Abstract
The aim of the present study was to investigate the effectiveness of a brief 
online normalisation intervention about intrusive thoughts (in the form of an 
interactive quiz) in a group of young adults. It was predicted that compared to 
a control group, participants in the normalisation condition would report a 
greater decrease in problematic meta-cognitive beliefs, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms, emotional and behavioural reactions to intrusive thoughts and 
experiential avoidance. Dependent measures were assessed at pre-
intervention, post-intervention and two-week follow-up. An overall reduction 
in meta-cognitive beliefs was observed across both conditions, and maintained 
at follow-up in the normalisation condition. Reductions in experiential 
avoidance were observed from pre to post for the normalisation group, and a 
delayed reduction was observed at follow-up in the control condition. 
Reductions in obsessive-compulsive symptoms were observed from pre to 
post for the control condition only. No effects were observed on reactions to 
intrusive thoughts. The overall normalising effects of the study are discussed 
in the context of research on symptom monitoring and previous 
psychoeducation interventions.
Keywords: intrusive thoughts, normalisation, psychoeducation, obsessions, 
OCD
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Highlights
 This paper examines the effects of an online normalisation 
intervention on meta-cognitive beliefs
 Reductions in meta-cognitive beliefs were observed in both 
normalisation and control conditions
 The completion of questionnaires about intrusive thoughts is sufficient 
to bring about change in meta-cognitive beliefs
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2.2 Introduction
Intrusive thoughts are characterised by their spontaneous, non-volitional 
nature, which makes them disruptive to the current thought stream and 
consequently they can often be experienced as unwanted and difficult to 
control. Intrusive thoughts are a defining feature of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM IV; American Psychological Association [APA], 1994) criteria for 
OCD specify the experience of recurrent and persistent cognitions, 
experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and causing marked anxiety and 
distress. Cognitive models of OCD, which currently dominate our 
understanding and recommended treatment (National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence [NICE], 2005), purport that intrusive thoughts contribute 
to the development and maintenance of OCD.
Intrusive thoughts similar in content to those experienced by 
individuals with OCD are also a common experience in the general 
population: for example, Rachman and de Silva (1978) reported that 80% of a 
nonclinical sample reported experiencing intrusive thoughts considered to be 
similar in content and form to clinical obsessions. Rachman and de Silva also 
reported a comparison of intrusive thoughts of nonclinical participants with 
those reported by obsessional patients; the key differences identified were in 
frequency, duration and intensity of the thoughts. Obsessional participants 
also reported that their thoughts were less acceptable and less dismissible in 
comparison to nonclinical participants. The authors concluded that normal 
intrusive thoughts similar to clinical obsessions are a common experience. 
Following on from the research by Rachman and de Silva, current cognitive 
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models of OCD purport that the meaning attached to ‘normal’ intrusive 
thoughts, within the context of existing beliefs, contributes to the development 
and maintenance of the disorder.
Cognitive Theory of OCD
Current cognitive theories of OCD converge on the proposition that the 
individual’s understanding of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts is central in the 
development and maintenance of OCD; however, theories differ with respect 
to the proposed beliefs that influence the interpretation of these thoughts. 
According to Rachman (1997, 1998) ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts are 
interpreted as significant due to beliefs that fuse the thought to the event 
(thought-event-fusion [TEF]) or action (thought-action-fusion [TAF]), which 
consequently results in increased perceived responsibility and guilt. 
Subsequent emotional reactions are associated with perceived dismissibility of 
that thought and frequency of intrusive thoughts (Rachman, 1981). Salkovskis 
(1985, 1999) suggested that the key belief in the misinterpretation of normal 
intrusive thoughts is that one is responsible for harm coming to oneself or 
others. According to Salkovskis, responsibility beliefs increase the salience of 
intrusive thoughts to the individual, thus increasing attention to and 
accessibility of the thought and related stimuli. Rachman and Salkovskis 
suggest that the individual’s response to the occurrence of intrusive thoughts 
further maintains obsessional processes. Cognitive and behavioural strategies, 
such as thought suppression, neutralization and compulsions, are engaged in 
to manage threat and reduce associated anxiety and beliefs of responsibility. 
Avoidant responses to internal experiences have been shown to be higher in 
those with high OC symptoms, specifically a reluctance to experience 
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upsetting thoughts and emotions (Abramowitz, Lackey & Wheaton, 2009). 
However, these responses maintain dysfunctional beliefs and appraisals of 
intrusive thoughts, and thus ultimately maintain the disorder. 
Wells and Matthews (1994) and Wells (1997) also emphasised the 
meaning attached to intrusive thoughts in a meta-cognitive understanding of 
OCD. According to this model, meta-cognitive beliefs (beliefs about 
cognition and response strategies), including thought-action/thought-event 
fusion beliefs, directly influence the appraisal of intrusive thoughts as well as 
subsequent emotional and behavioural responses. Positive meta-cognitive 
beliefs about behavioural responses, such as compulsions and rituals, 
motivates their use in response to an intrusive thought; negative meta-
cognitive beliefs, such as fearing loss of control, are activated by the 
continued experience of intrusive thoughts and resultant anxiety. The meta-
cognitive theory similarly understands responses to intrusive thoughts as 
maintaining OCD by reducing opportunities for disconfirmation of 
problematic meta-cognitive beliefs.
Thus the interpretation of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts is thought to be 
key in the development of OCD, as well as contributing to the maintenance of 
the disorder. Problematic meta-cognitive beliefs may indicate elevated risk of 
developing OCD. Meta-cognitive beliefs have previously been correlated with 
symptoms of OCD in a nonclinical sample (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). 
Further investigations have demonstrated that specific meta-cognitive beliefs 
implicated by the meta-cognitive model of OCD are predictive of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms, such as the uncontrollability and danger of intrusive 
thoughts and the need for cognitive control (Myers & Wells, 2005; Gwilliam, 
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Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), as well as thought-action fusion 
(Gwilliam, Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999. 
Myers, Fisher and Wells (2009) demonstrated that meta-cognitive beliefs are 
uniquely predictive of obsessive-compulsive symptoms in a prospective 
study, thus specifically supporting a causal relationship. Identification of 
problematic meta-cognitive beliefs about intrusive thoughts may offer the 
opportunity for early intervention in OCD.
Prevention
Rachman (1998) suggested that if the catastrophic misinterpretation of 
intrusive thoughts could be altered to a benign alternative, then the associated 
internal and external cues would no longer be seen as threatening, thus 
reducing emotional reaction to that thought. With a benign interpretation of 
intrusive thoughts and little emotional reaction, the perceived dismissibility of 
that thought might be increased and thus the intrusive thought could be 
dismissed as insignificant and further avoidant responses could be prevented. 
Consistent with Rachman, Salkovskis (1985) also stated, “If they believe that 
odd thoughts with an unpleasant content can occur and have no further 
implications, then the sequence will terminate here.” (p. 578). Individuals who 
endorse problematic meta-cognitive beliefs could be at risk of developing 
OCD, thus an intervention targeted at reducing these beliefs could act to 
prevent transition into clinical status.
Previous research has demonstrated that the alteration of meta-
cognitive beliefs through Cognitive-Behavioural techniques, such as exposure 
and response prevention, is associated with a reduction in symptoms in OCD 
patients (e.g. Fisher & Wells, 2005), and that this alteration in meta-cognitive 
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beliefs accounts for a significant amount of variation in symptoms (Solem, 
Håland, Vogel, Hansen, & Wells, 2009). Normalisation is another component 
of CBT, which is regularly included in treatment manuals for OCD (e.g. 
Wells, 1997), and could offer a means of altering sub-clinical levels of beliefs 
about intrusive thoughts. Psychoeducation about intrusive thoughts has been 
shown to effectively reduce endorsement of meta-cognitive beliefs. Zucker, 
Craske, Barrios and Holguin (2002) randomly assigned participants with high 
scores on the TAF scale (Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) to receive 
psychoeducational information about intrusive thoughts and thought action 
fusion or information about stress only. Effects on anxiety and TAF 
endorsement were assessed following induction of thought-action fusion 
through a sentence completion task: participants were asked to complete the 
following sentence with the name of a friend or relative: ‘I hope _____ is in a 
car accident’ (originally developed by Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & 
Teachman, 1996). Psychoeducation about TAF led to a decrease in 
endorsement of TAF beliefs pre- to post-task, compared to the control ‘stress 
education’. Anxiety was shown to increase in both groups (measured by 
visual analogue scale, and state measure), but psychoeducation about TAF 
mitigated the increase in anxiety, such that the control group reported greater 
increase in scores (visual analogue measure only). Zucker, Craske, Blackmore 
and Nitz (2006) extended this work in order to test the effects of a 3-hour 
cognitive behavioural workshop on OCD symptoms and TAF endorsement 
for individuals classed as experiencing ‘subclinical OCD’. Individuals with 
high scores on the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977) and the Self Report Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive 
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Scale (Baer, 1991) (cut offs selected to represent minimal levels of obsessive-
compulsive symptomatology) were assigned to either the workshop group or a 
waitlist control group. The workshop included psychoeducational content 
about intrusive thoughts, compulsive behaviours, thought suppression, 
distraction and avoidance; also included was an exposure and response 
prevention task, cognitive restructuring and a plan for dealing with intrusive 
thoughts.  Although no difference was observed in symptoms between groups 
(both decreased over time), the workshop led to significant reductions in 
endorsements of intrusive thoughts, compulsive habits and TAF beliefs at 
one- and five-month follow ups.
Marino-Carper, Negy, Burns and Lunt (2010) also examined the 
effects of a psychoeducational intervention on TAF and responsibility beliefs, 
including a measure of the tendency to suppress thoughts (White Bear 
Suppression Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Individuals with high 
endorsements of TAF beliefs were randomly assigned to either the 
experimental condition, for which they received a psychoeducational message 
about intrusive thoughts and TAF, or one of two control conditions: 
psychoeducaton on intrusive thoughts only or psychoeducation on stress only. 
Differential effects were observed in the experimental group for TAF beliefs, 
compared to the control groups: TAF-morality, the belief that having a 
thought is morally equivalent to carrying the action out, was reduced by TAF 
education, but the intervention did not reduce TAF likelihood, the belief that 
having a thought increases the probability of it occurring. The effects on TAF-
morality were not maintained at 2-week follow-up; however, TAF-likelihood 
had reduced in the TAF-education group at follow-up. TAF education was 
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also demonstrated to prevent an increase in thought suppression scores 
observed in the control conditions. The findings reported by Marino-Carper et 
al. further support those from Zucker et al. (2002, 2006), and demonstrate that 
psychoeducation can reduce endorsements of meta-cognitive beliefs about 
thought-action fusion. Thus, normalisation may alter meta-cognitive beliefs 
about intrusive thoughts, mitigating the distress associated with these 
thoughts, and reducing obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
The current study was designed to add to the literature in several ways: 
the measurement of beliefs about intrusive thoughts is extended to meta-
cognitive beliefs more generally in order to assess the effects of normalisation 
on a collection of problematic meta-cognitive beliefs. The psychoeducational 
information on intrusive thoughts is delivered as an online intervention in an 
interactive format, thus extending previous research to more accessible and 
brief means of delivery. A further advantage of this delivery method is a 
reduction in experimenter or therapist effects, thereby partialling out non-
specific effects in order to more accurately estimate intervention-specific 
effects.
Thus, the current study aims to test the hypothesis that normalising 
information will lead to a reduction in the endorsement of meta-cognitive 
beliefs and presence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, as well as reductions 
in emotional and behavioural reactions and experiential avoidance as 
responses to intrusive thoughts. Young adults (18-20 years) with high levels 
of problematic meta-cognitive beliefs were recruited to represent a group at 
potential risk of developing OCD (Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 
1988). 
62
2.3 Method
Design
A one-within one-between participant design was employed. Participants 
were randomly allocated to the normalisation or control conditions. The 
effects of condition were examined on four dependent measures: meta-
cognitive beliefs, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, emotional and behavioural 
reactions to intrusive thoughts and experiential avoidance at time one (pre-
intervention), time two (post-intervention) and time three (two week follow 
up). 
In the normalisation condition participants received information about 
the experience of intrusive thoughts in the general population via an 
interactive quiz. Participants in the control condition completed an interactive 
quiz about pets in the UK, delivered in the same format as the normalisation 
quiz.
The study was delivered via the internet, advertised within the 
University of Manchester volunteering webpages (Thesis Appendix 3) and 
hosted within the University of Manchester School of Psychological Sciences 
webpages.
Participants
Two hundred and sixteen students, aged 18-20 years, from the University of 
Manchester, were screened for subsequent selection. These participants 
accessed detailed information about the study (Thesis Appendix 4) and 
completed an informed consent form (Thesis Appendix 5), demographics 
questionnaire (gender and age), and the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire 
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(Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) online. In exchange, all participants that 
completed the screening process were entered into a prize draw for three £20 
cash prizes. Of those students, 148 (68.52%) scored at least one standard 
deviation above the mean of a nonclinical sample, as established in previous 
research (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) and were invited to participate in 
the study. The mean age of participants was 19.14 years (SD = .76) and 65.5% 
were female. Each participant was randomly assigned to either the 
normalisation (n = 75) or the control condition (n = 73). As the study was 
online, the attrition rate varies through the course of the study: The 
CONSORT diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the flow of participants through 
each stage of this study, and represents those included in data analyses.
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
Materials
Intervention.
The normalisation quiz consisted of eight questions (over six webpages) that 
asked participants to estimate how common intrusive thoughts are in the 
general population. For example, participants were asked what proportion of 
young people said that they have intrusive thoughts and to place example 
intrusive thoughts into pre-defined categories, such as ‘thoughts about sex’ 
and ‘self-doubt’. Questions were based on information from previous research 
on intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples (Rachman and de Silva, 1978; 
Parkinson & Rachman, 1981). The normalisation information was designed to 
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emphasise the high occurrence of such thoughts in the general adult 
population.
Prior to beginning the quiz, participants were given the following 
definition of intrusive thoughts:
Intrusive thoughts are thoughts that pop into your head 
unexpectedly. People have different beliefs about these thoughts, 
and react differently to them: some are upset by them, others are 
not.
The control quiz consisted of eight questions (over six webpages) that 
asked participants to estimate how common different pets are within the 
United Kingdom, representing a neutral topic. For example, participants were 
asked to rank order the type of animals that are most commonly kept as pets 
and to put example animal breeds into their correct animal category, such as 
‘dog’ and ‘bird’. Questions were designed to match the format of the 
normalisation quiz, and based on pet statistics information obtained from the 
Pet Food Manufacturers’ Association webpages (2010).
Prior to beginning the quiz, participants in the control condition were 
given the following definition of a pet: 
A pet is a tamed animal kept for amusement or companionship.
For both quizzes, participants were presented with the correct answers 
to each question following the submission of their own answers on each 
webpage.
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The normalisation and control quizzes are available from the first
author (Thesis Appendices 6a and 6b).
Questionnaires.
The following measures were completed online at the three time points (pre-, 
post-intervention and two-week follow-up) and were ordered as follows:
The Meta-Cognition Questionnaire – 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004; Thesis Appendix 7) is a 30-item self-report questionnaire 
measuring beliefs about thinking and thinking processes. Participants are 
required to rate their agreement to each item on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (do not agree) to 4 (agree very much). Meta-cognitive beliefs are 
measured on five sub-scales: 1) cognitive confidence; 2) positive beliefs; 3) 
cognitive self-consciousness; 4) uncontrollability and danger; 5) need to 
control thoughts. Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004) reported good temporal 
stability (coefficient of .75 for test-retest over 22-118days) and internal 
consistency ( = .72 to .93 for subscales).
Leyton Obsessional Inventory – Short Form (LOI-SF; Mathews, Jang, Hami, 
& Stein, 2004; Thesis Appendix 8) is a 30-item self-report inventory 
measuring presence of OCD symptoms using a yes/no format. Symptoms are 
measured within four factors: 1) contamination; 2) doubts/repeating; 3) 
checking/detail; 4) worries/just right. Mathews et al. reported good internal 
reliability ( = .81) and validity, demonstrated by predicted correlations with 
measures of psychopathology, including anxiety and depression.
Emotional and Behavioural Reactions to Intrusions Questionnaire (EBRIQ; 
Berry, Andrade, May, & Kavanagh, 2010; Thesis Appendix 9) is a seven-item 
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self-report questionnaire, measuring individual reactions to intrusive thoughts. 
Participants are required to rate each item according to how often it applies 
when they experience intrusive thoughts on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 
(never) to 4 (every time). Two subscales represent emotional reactions and 
behavioural reactions to intrusive thoughts. Berry et al. (2010) reported good 
temporal stability (coefficient = .68 for test-retest over 30-70 days) and 
validity, demonstrated by predicted correlations with measures of avoidant 
cognitive strategies of thought suppression and experiential avoidance. The 
scale was originally developed within the context of intrusive thoughts in 
craving, but has been successfully adapted to assess reactions to other 
intrusive thoughts (e.g. self harm; Batey, May & Andrade, 2010).
Action and Acceptance Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004; Thesis 
Appendix 10) is a nine-item self-report questionnaire, measuring severity of 
experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, and difficulty in acting in the presence 
of negative private events. Participants are required to rate each item according 
to how often it is true for them on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never 
true) to 7 (always true). Hayes et al. (2004) reported good temporal stability 
(coefficient of .64 for test-retest over four months) and internal consistency (
= .70).
Procedure
Participants began by completing all questionnaire measures above (Time 1: 
pre-intervention), after which they were directed to complete either the 
control or intervention quiz online, depending on their condition. Following 
completion of the intervention stage, all participants were directed to 
complete the questionnaire measures for a second time (Time 2: post-
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intervention). Participants were then directed to a webpage thanking them for 
their participation so far and informing them that they would be emailed in 
two weeks time to complete the study.
Two-weeks after they had completed the first phase of the study, each 
participant was emailed an invitation and a web-link to complete the 
questionnaire measures for a third time (Time 3: follow-up). Of 148 
participants emailed (those who completed pre-intervention MCQ-30), 
41.21% accessed the follow-up questionnaire measures (those who completed 
follow-up MCQ-30). Following completion of the questionnaire measures, 
participants were directed to a webpage thanking them for their participation 
in the study and informing them that they will be emailed again shortly with 
further details of the study. All participants that registered to take part in the 
study were emailed debrief information, which included support information 
on mental health support services. Prize draw winners were randomly selected 
using the random sampling option within Microsoft Excel; winners were 
notified by email and subsequently arranged to collect their prize from the 
experimenter.
Data analysis
Means, standard deviations, medians and inter-quartile ranges were computed 
for each of the measures at pre-intervention, post-intervention, and two-week 
follow-up. All measures were scrutinised for outliers through inspection of 
descriptive box-plots for each measure (a total of seven outliers were 
identified across measures). In cases where outliers emerged, analyses were 
repeated without the outliers; none of the significance levels changed with the 
exclusion of these outliers. Thus, the analyses reported below are with the 
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entire sample. The actual N varies across analyses to reflect the attrition rate 
at each point: Pairwise deletion was employed for missing data. 
Due to the selected sample of high scorers on the MCQ-30, some of 
the measures did not meet parametric assumptions. Variables were 
transformed; however, little improvement in skewness and kurtosis confirmed 
no advantage to transformation (Logarithm, Square Root, and Inverted 
transformations). Therefore, Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were used to 
compare pre and post scores on the self-report measures for the control and 
normalisation conditions. Change scores on the MCQ-30 (pre to post) were 
compared between conditions using a Mann-Whitney U test. Finally, stability 
of changes was assessed by comparing pre and follow-up scores using 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for the control and normalisation conditions.
2.4 Results
Group equivalence
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated no significant difference between groups on 
the baseline measurements of the MCQ-30 (U(148) = 2648, z = -.34, p = .73, r
= .03), LOI-SF (U(144) = 2253, z = -1.36, p = .18, r = .11), EBRIQ (U(140) = 
2154, z = -1.23, p = .22, r = .10) and AAQ (U(133) = 1917, z = -1.33, p = .19, 
r = .11). Both groups can thus be considered equivalent. Descriptive statistics 
for each of the self-report measures by condition are displayed in Table 1.
Main analyses
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed a significant reduction in MCQ-30 scores 
pre- to post-intervention for both control, z(61) = -4.41, p < .001, r = .40, and 
normalisation groups, z(60) = -4.51, p < .001, r = .41. A Mann-Whitney U test 
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revealed no significant difference in MCQ-30 change scores (pre to post-
intervention) between the control group and normalisation group, U(121) = 
1532.5, z = -1.55, p = .12, r = .14. The decrease in LOI-SF scores in the 
control group was significant (z(58) = -2.12, p = .03, r = .20), but no 
significant difference in LOI-SF scores was found for the normalisation group 
(z(60) = 1.30, p = .76, r = .03). Pre- and post-intervention EBRIQ scores did 
not differ for either control (z(48) = -1.55, p = .12, r = .16) or intervention 
groups (z(60) = -.01, p = .993, r = .001). Post-intervention AAQ scores were 
found to be significantly lower than pre-intervention AAQ scores for the 
normalisation group (z(59) = -2.58, p = .01, r = .24), but not for the control 
group (z(53) = -1.20, p = .23, r = .12.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Subscale analysis.
Pre and post comparisons of scores on the five MCQ-30 subscales were made 
using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests. Bonferroni corrections were applied to 
reduce the possibility of type 1 errors; therefore a conservative alpha level of 
.005 was adopted for the ten comparisons. A significant reduction in scores on 
the ‘uncontrollability and danger’ subscale was observed for the normalisation 
condition (z(60) = -4.33, p < .001, r  = .40), pre (Md = 16; IQR = 6) to post 
(Md = 15; IQR = 8), and the control condition (z(61) = -4.71, p < .001, r  = 
.43), pre (Md = 17; IQR = 6) to post (Md = 15; IQR = 7). In addition, scores 
on the ‘need to control’ subscale significantly reduced for both the 
normalisation condition (z(60) = -4.90, p < .001, r  = .45), pre (Md = 14; IQR
= 4) to post (Md = 11; IQR = 5), and the control condition (z(61) = -3.56, p < 
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.001, r = .32), pre (Md = 13; IQR = 5) to post (Md = 12; IQR = 5). A 
significant reduction in scores on the ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ subscale 
was observed in the control condition only (z(61) = -2.80, p < .005, r  = .25), 
from pre (Md = 18; IQR = 5.5) to post (Md = 17; IQR = 7). All other MCQ-30 
subscale comparisons were non-significant.
Follow-up analysis
Of the 41.21% of participants that accessed the follow-up questionnaires four 
were excluded from follow-up analyses as they had not completed post-
intervention measures. Mann-Whitney U tests confirmed that participants who 
completed the self-report measures at follow-up were not different to those 
who did not in terms of MCQ-30, LOI-SF, EBRIQ, or AAQ scores at pre and 
post-intervention.
Follow-up scores were compared with pre scores for each condition. 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests confirmed a significant difference between pre 
and follow-up MCQ-30 scores for the normalisation condition (z(27) = -3.03, 
p = .002, r = .41); in the control condition the difference approached 
significance (z(30) = -1.75, p = .08, r = .23). The LOI –SF differences were 
non-significant for the normalisation (z(27) = -.62, p = .536, r = .08) and the 
control condition (z(28) = -.26, p = .80, r = .03). The EBRIQ differences were 
non-significant for the normalisation condition (z(27) = -1.27, p = .21, r = .17) 
and the control condition (z(28) = -1.10, p = .27, r = .15). The decrease in 
AAQ scores was significant for the normalisation condition (z(27) = -2.21, p = 
.03, r = .30) and the control condition (z(28) = -3.39, p = .001, r = .45).
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2.5 Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the effectiveness of a brief online 
normalisation intervention for problematic meta-cognitive beliefs in a sample 
of young adults with elevated meta-cognitive beliefs. It was hypothesised that 
individuals who completed a quiz about the prevalence of intrusive thoughts 
would report significant reductions in meta-cognitive beliefs, reactions to 
intrusive thoughts, obsessive-compulsive symptoms and experiential 
avoidance; it was also predicted that these effects would be greater than those 
found in a control condition, who completed a quiz about pets. These 
predictions were partly supported. Reductions in meta-cognitive beliefs from 
pre to post were observed in both conditions; however, there were no 
differences between conditions. At a two-week follow-up the reduction in 
meta-cognitive beliefs was maintained for the normalisation group, but 
dropped below significance for the control group. No changes were observed 
for reactions to intrusive thoughts for either condition, and reduction in OC 
symptoms was only observed from pre to post for the control group. The 
normalisation group demonstrated a reduction in experiential avoidance pre to 
post, which was maintained at follow-up. Although, no change was observed 
in experiential avoidance for the control group post-intervention, reductions 
were observed at follow-up.
The results from this study add to the growing body of literature on the 
alteration of meta-cognitive beliefs through educational material. The lack of 
difference between conditions is inconsistent with previous studies that have 
demonstrated that compared to controls, educational interventions lead to a 
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greater reduction in thought-action fusion beliefs (Zucker et al., 2002, 2006). 
The overall reduction in meta-cognitive beliefs extends the current literature 
by demonstrating that structured interventions may not be necessary to bring 
about change in meta-cognitive beliefs, but rather the process of completing 
questionnaires may be sufficient in itself to bring about change. This finding 
is comparable to the overall reduction in obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
observed by Zucker et al. (2006), which the authors explained in terms of the 
waxing and waning nature of OCD, but rather may have been an artefact of 
completing measures relating to symptoms. A normalising effect of 
completing questionnaires is consistent with previous research demonstrating 
effective change through symptom monitoring. Previous studies have 
illustrated that symptom monitoring over the course of just four weeks can 
bring about a reduction in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms 
to below the previously diagnosed level (Reynolds & Tarrier, 1996; Tarrier et 
al., 1999). Hardy and Stallard (2008) have replicated these findings in a group 
of children that had recent experience of a road-traffic accident, demonstrating 
that symptom monitoring led to a reduction in accident-related thoughts and a 
significant reduction PTSD symptoms. 
Subscale analysis of pre and post scores on the MCQ-30 indicated that 
‘uncontrollability and danger’ and ‘need to control’ reduced across both 
conditions. These findings are consistent with previous research 
demonstrating the role of these specific meta-cognitive beliefs in the 
development of OCD. Myers and Wells (2005) reported that meta-cognitive 
beliefs about uncontrollability and danger and need to control thoughts, 
alongside thought-fusion beliefs, were uniquely correlated with obsessive-
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compulsive symptoms. Changes in beliefs about uncontrollability and danger 
and the need to control thoughts are understandable given that the process of 
completing the current study may highlight that intrusive thoughts are 
common and normal, therefore participants may reconsider the implications of 
experiencing such thoughts. The control condition also demonstrated a 
reduction in scores on the ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ scale; although, the 
effect size was reduced in comparison to the other subscale effects. A possible 
reduction in ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ may also be understood within 
normalising effects of completing the study, as participants may conclude that 
heightened awareness of their conscious stream is not necessary. However, 
the lack of reduction in the normalisation condition does not support this 
conclusion. Therefore, further replication of potential normalising effects of 
completing questionnaires about intrusive thoughts should aim to clarify 
specific meta-cognitive beliefs that may be affected. 
The reduction in total MCQ-30 scores should be interpreted with 
caution; although the observed reduction in meta-cognitive beliefs was 
significant in the current study, the post-intervention means remained at least 
1.5 standard deviations above the established nonclinical group mean (Wells 
& Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). Thus the benefits of completing the study for 
this high-risk group were not sufficient enough to bring about a reduction to 
below mean. The observed findings could be a reflection of regression toward 
the mean (which would be expected to bring about a reduction of 
approximately 6.6 points), and therefore require replication. In addition, it is 
possible that the normalising intervention employed in this study could be 
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developed further to produce a meaningful change in meta-cognitive beliefs; 
this is discussed below in comparison with previous studies.
In addition to the effects on meta-cognitive beliefs, the current 
findings demonstrated that psychoeducation can be effective in reducing 
experiential avoidance, and that the process of completing questionnaires may 
bring about a delayed effect on experiential avoidance. Alongside the effects 
on meta-cognitive beliefs, this finding supports the maintaining role that 
avoidant strategies may play in OCD, such that the appraisal of intrusive 
thoughts fuels ineffective response strategies. Further research is needed to 
clarify the relative effects of specific interventions compared to symptom 
monitoring alone, and to investigate the links between meta-cognitive beliefs 
and experiential avoidance. 
The inconsistent effects on OCD symptoms, and lack of change in 
reactions to intrusive thoughts, are difficult to reconcile within current models 
of OCD and did not support the direct link between meta-cognitive beliefs and 
OCD symptoms suggested by the meta-cognitive model. The observed mean 
pre score on the Leyton Obsessional Inventory- short form for both conditions 
was within one standard deviation above the previous nonclinical mean in 
young adults; in addition, the percentage scoring above 20 (indicative of 
probable OCD) was in line with previous studies (Mathews, Jang, Hami, & 
Stein, 2004). The pattern of scores on the LOI-SF in the present study 
suggests that screening by scores on the MCQ-30 resulted in a sample of 
individuals high in obsessionality. Therefore, the lack of change cannot be 
explained as a lack of presence of symptoms overall. However, the lack of 
change in obsessionality could be due to the measure used: the LOI-SF is 
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limited in terms of assessing symptom presence/absence. An additional 
measure of severity of symptoms (such as the Self-report Yale-Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale [Y-BOCS], Baer, 1991) would have been 
beneficial and potentially more sensitive to changes; previous studies have 
suggested the inclusion of multiple measures of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (Solem et al., 2009). Wider measures of psychopathology may also 
have indicated different results. Meta-cognitive beliefs are not a unique 
feature of OCD, but rather feature in a number of disorders, therefore, 
measures assessing symptoms of other mental health problems have the 
potential to extend the findings here (e.g. Generalised Anxiety Disorder). 
Future research may also consider the inclusion of measures of intrusive 
thoughts directly, to assess effects on frequency, duration, intensity, and 
dismissibility, for example. Diary studies could track the effects on intrusive 
thoughts over the course of several weeks.
A longer follow-up period in future studies may help to ascertain the 
duration of normalising effects from the process of completing questionnaires. 
Zucker et al. (2006) illustrated effects of psychoeducation on symptoms at a 
5-month follow up. The findings from the current study suggested that 
changes in meta-cognitive beliefs through completion of questionnaires may 
wane after a couple of weeks, but that normalisation information may have an 
additional benefit. Thus, future research could be directed toward a 
comparison of the longevity of the two effects in order to better understand 
any additional benefits of psychoeducation. The reduced response rate for 
follow-up may have limited the findings within the current study. The 
response rate may have biased the findings in terms of the participants; for 
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example, participants that responded at follow-up may have been more 
engaged or attentive to the interventions, or potentially may have represented 
individuals for whom intrusive thoughts are more salient. Comparisons of 
participants who responded to follow-up and those who did not confirmed no 
differences in the variables assessed. Future research may wish to reduce the 
attrition rate for follow-up assessments; the addition of a further incentive for 
participation at follow-up may increase the response rate.
To the authors’ knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to 
use an interactive online format for delivering psychoeducational information. 
Therapeutic effects of experimenter contact were removed in the present 
study, thus the observed effects can be attributed to the process of completing 
the study alone. This study indicates the potential for internet-based 
psychoeducational interventions. Future research should consider the use of 
online interventions in order to reach a wide audience and to engage an 
increasingly virtually focussed generation. Further to this, the format of online 
interventions is important to consider. The interactive quiz format utilised in 
the current study may provide an explanation for the lack of effect of 
psychoeducation on meta-cognitive beliefs: that is that the intervention was 
potentially too brief to bring about greater changes. 
Previous psychoeducation interventions that have targeted meta-
cognitive beliefs have ranged from a brief audio psychoeducation message 
(Zucker et al., 2002) to a 3-hour cognitive-behavioural workshop (Zucker et 
al., 2006). It is possible that reading psychoeducational information prior to 
the quiz may have consolidated the information further to engender greater 
changes in meta-cognitive beliefs. Relatedly, the normalisation information 
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used in the current study related to the prevalence of intrusive thoughts more 
generally; whereas, previous studies have demonstrated successful changes in 
beliefs by providing specific educational information about thought-action 
fusion (e.g. Zucker et al., 2002). More substantial reductions in meta-
cognitive beliefs might be observed with the addition of specific information 
about the nature of these beliefs. 
The intervention developed for the current study was based upon 
widely cited research findings on the prevalence and nature of intrusive 
thoughts in non-clinical samples (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Parkinson & 
Rachman, 1981). The provision of this information is recommended within 
CBT for OCD as part of education about mental events. For example, Wells 
(1997) states that information relating to the prevalence of normal obsessions 
should be provided to obsessional patients as part of educational 
‘bibliotherapy’, citing the research by Rachman and de Silva as a source for 
this information (p. 237). However, more formal means of validation of the 
intervention were not undertaken in the current study. The assessment of 
content validity could provide confirmation that the intervention developed is 
considered a ‘normalisation’ intervention. For example, inter-rater agreement 
on the essential nature of the information provided could be obtained from 
consultation with an expert panel. Alternatively, the intervention could be 
developed in consultation with focus groups sampled from the target 
population.
In summary, the current study demonstrated that completion of 
questionnaires relating to meta-cognitions can be sufficient to bring about real 
change in those and related avoidant responses. Future research should aim to 
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replicate and extend these findings. An increased understanding of the 
respective effects of symptom monitoring and psychoeducation may aid the 
development of effective preventative interventions for OCD and potentially 
other mental health problems in which meta-cognitive beliefs play a key role. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for each self-report measure at pre, post and follow-up by
condition
Dependent variables
MCQ-30 LOI-SF EBRIQ AAQ
Pre Post f-u Pre Post f-u Pre Post f-u Pre Post f-u
Control condition
Mean 74.82 71.89 71.40 12.14 11.62 11.32 41.65 40.63 38.18 39.72 39.21 37.68
Median 74 71 69 13 12 12 41.5 42.5 36.50 41 39 37.5
Standard deviation 8.67 9.04 9.55 4.38 4.77 3.85 9.97 10.82 10.63 6.81 6.72 8.19
Interquartile range 14 11 15.25 7 6.25 3 13.25 13 15.75 10 9 12.25
Normalisation condition
Mean 74.9 70.77 68.74 11.27 11.47 11.96 38 37.72 36.85 38.53 37.25 36.11
Median 72 69 68 11 11 11 41 42 40 40 39 35.5
Standard deviation 9.49 10.54 9.30 4.31 4.52 3.66 13.55 13.69 14.47 6.93 7.46 8.63
Interquartile range 11 13.75 13 5 7 5 19.75 20.75 24 11.25 12 12
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. A consort diagram illustrating the flow of participants through each 
stage of the study.
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3. Critical Appraisal
The aim of the work in this thesis was to utilise the current cognitive 
understanding of obsessive intrusive thoughts in the nonclinical population, 
alongside cognitive theory of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), in 
order to develop and test an online intervention intended to mitigate the 
development of normal intrusive thoughts into clinical obsessions in at risk 
young adults. The first paper presented within this thesis is a literature review 
of previous research investigating intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples. 
The literature review constitutes the background for the research conducted, 
which is subsequently presented in the second paper in this thesis. There are 
limitations to the literature review process and the study conducted, which are 
discussed below in more detail within a critique of the papers. In addition, this 
section of the thesis includes a consideration of the implications for clinical 
and research practice, and the researcher’s reflection on the process of 
conducting the body of work presented.
3.1 Critique of Papers
A main supposition of cognitive theories of OCD is that negative 
interpretations of ‘normal’ intrusive thoughts determine the development and 
maintenance of the disorder (e.g. Rachman, 1997; 1998; Salkovskis, 1985; 
1999; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells, 1997). Thus intrusive thoughts are 
assumed to be a normal experience in the nonclinical population, and the 
misinterpretation of these thoughts leads to clinical obsessions. The first paper 
presented in this thesis addressed this assumption in a narrative review of the 
literature: the aim of the literature review was to investigate whether 
nonclinical individuals experience intrusive thoughts similar to obsessions 
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that are experienced by individuals with OCD. The findings from research 
that investigated obsessive intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples were 
discussed within sections considered important to the comparison with 
obsessions, including prevalence and content of intrusive thoughts, and 
response strategies used. The literature review concluded that research 
findings demonstrate that intrusive thoughts with obsessive content do occur 
in the general population, but that important differences exist between these 
cognitions and obsessions in clinical samples. Intrusive thoughts were 
experienced by clinical samples as more frequent, severe and spontaneous; 
reported re-experiencing of intrusive thoughts by clinical samples was related 
to differences in appraisals and response strategies, compared to nonclinical 
samples. The current assumption by Cognitive theories of OCD, that the 
appraisal of intrusive thoughts leads to their development into obsessions was 
supported by previous research, which demonstrated that appraisals of guilt, 
dismissibility, thought control, thought-action fusion and responsibility, all 
correlate with the frequency of intrusive thoughts. The reported differences in 
appraisals between clinical and nonclinical samples support cognitive
theories, which suggest that the appraisal of intrusive thoughts is a key factor 
in the development of OCD. The literature review highlighted the current 
lacunae in research on intrusive thoughts and obsessions; further clarification 
is required about the defining differences between obsessions and nonclinical 
intrusive thoughts. Although, many differences have been highlighted, for 
example, frequency, severity, and appraisal, it is currently not clear which of 
these differences determines the status of ‘obsession’ and thus the 
development of OCD. The correlations between appraisals and frequency 
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require further investigation in future research to clarify the causal direction 
of these relationships; in particular, it will be important for future research to
consider whether appraisals determine the frequency of intrusive thoughts, or 
whether frequency influences how the intrusive thought is appraised.
The method with which the literature search was conducted allowed 
the identification of relevant empirical papers that investigated obsessive 
intrusive thoughts in nonclinical samples. The literature search did not allow 
for the inclusion of nonpublished material, such as theses or dissertations, nor 
work published in book chapters. However, a flexible approach, which 
included a manual review of references in each paper, allowed the 
identification of a substantial body of relevant studies (thirty-five papers). 
Meaningful conclusions in line with the aims of the literature review were 
drawn from a discussion of this research. An aim of the literature review 
presented in this thesis was to provide an overview of the research on 
intrusive thoughts in the nonclinical population, and a discussion of the 
relevance of this literature to OCD, therefore a narrative approach was 
adopted in order to synthesise the wide-ranging literature. An alterative 
approach to the literature review process would have been to conduct a 
systematic literature review. A systematic approach would have set tighter 
constraints on the methodology of the literature review and the question 
addressed, which would have been appropriate for a review of one aspect of 
intrusive thoughts, such as appraisal. The aims of the review were to provide a 
comparison of intrusive thoughts with obsessions, and so multiple aspects of 
the nature of intrusive thoughts were included. Thus, a narrative approach was 
favoured in order to allow scope for a wider discussion and critique. As the 
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body of literature on intrusive thoughts grows, and provides further data on 
each specific aspect of these cognitions, then a systematic review or a meta-
analysis would be a useful addition to the literature. For example, a meta-
analysis on the difference in frequency of intrusive thoughts between 
nonclinical and OCD samples would further the current understanding of the 
potential defining differences between nonclinical intrusive thoughts and 
obsessions.
Although the literature review covered many aspects of intrusive 
thoughts, including prevalence, content and appraisal, a detailed consideration 
of the form of intrusive thoughts was not included. The definition of intrusive 
thoughts adopted for the purposes of the review was deliberately broad and 
included different forms of intrusive thoughts, for example images and verbal 
thoughts. However, many of the studies discussed focussed on the verbal form 
of intrusions through questionnaire measurement; this reflected the dominance 
in the literature of the assessment of verbal intrusive thoughts. Consideration 
of the form of obsessive intrusions in future reviews could add to the 
understanding of OCD and the hypothesised continuum from ‘normal’ 
intrusive thoughts to obsessions. It is possible that individuals with OCD may 
experience more urges/impulses that drive cognitive and behavioural 
responses, as compared to the verbal intrusions reported by nonclinical 
individuals in previous research. Thus a worthy pursuit for future reviews of 
the literature would be to consider the form of intrusive thoughts in both 
clinical and nonclinical samples. The purpose of the literature review in this 
thesis was achieved with a broad definition of intrusive thoughts; a wide range 
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of studies were considered from which meaningful conclusions were drawn in 
line with the aims.
Consistent with the focus of this thesis, the literature review was 
limited to intrusive thoughts in the context of OCD. However, intrusive 
thoughts feature in a number of other clinical disorders, such as posttraumatic 
stress disorder (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998), generalised anxiety disorder 
(Ruscio & Borcovec, 2004), and psychosis (Morrison & Baker, 2000). A 
review of the research on intrusive thoughts across disorders was beyond the 
scope and aims of this thesis; however, the aims of the literature review could 
be extended to other contexts in the future, in order to determine if intrusive 
thoughts experienced within other clinical disorders are also experienced by 
nonclinical individuals.
A thorough review of the relevant literature supported the hypothesis 
that obsessive intrusive thoughts are a common experience in the nonclinical 
population. This premise set up the empirical work subsequently presented in 
the second paper of this thesis, which investigated the effects of an interactive 
normalising intervention on meta-cognitive beliefs. In this way, the 
intervention targeted dysfunctional appraisals of intrusive that are proposed to 
lead to the development of OCD (Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells, 1997). A 
large group of young adults were screened into the study based on higher than 
average endorsements of meta-cognitive beliefs; the inclusion criteria aimed 
to produce a sample of individuals who may have elevated risk of developing 
OCD. Participants were recruited online and completed an interactive quiz 
based on either data regarding the occurrence of intrusive thoughts 
(normalising) or relating to pet ownership (control). Effects of each quiz were 
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assessed on measures of meta-cognitive beliefs (MCQ-30), OCD symptoms 
(LOI-SF), experiential avoidance (AAQ) and reactions to intrusive thoughts 
(EBRIQ). Means plots for each measure can be seen in Appendix 11.
The results did not support the main hypothesis that normalising 
would reduce endorsements of meta-cognitive beliefs, but rather an overall 
reduction in meta-cognitive beliefs was observed across both experimental 
and control groups. Two possible explanations for this finding were discussed 
within the second paper. First, that the completion of the study, including 
repeated exposure to questionnaire measures, in itself reduced meta-cognitive 
beliefs, which is in line with previous studies illustrating effects from 
symptom monitoring alone within other clinical contexts (Reynolds & Tarrier, 
1996; Tarrier et al., 1999). The other possible explanation is that the 
difference between pre and post intervention scores represented the effect of a 
regression to the mean. The point change expected through regression to the 
mean (6.6 point reduction; calculated using previous data from Wells and 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) was above that observed in each condition of the 
current research. Therefore it is feasible that the observed effect was due to a 
regression to the mean. The study sample was specifically selected for high 
scores on the pre MCQ-30, and represented the top 15.8% of the population. 
Therefore the mean score had room to regress to the mean. One way to reduce 
the effect of regression to the mean is to compare post  scores between groups 
with pre-intervention scores as a covariate within an analysis of covariance
(Vickers & Altman 2001). However, the violation of parametric assumptions 
in the current data precluded the use of an analysis of covariance.
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The normality of each measure was assessed prior to the statistical 
analyses. A formal test of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic) 
supplemented the inspection of skewness and kurtosis values (see Appendix 
12), as well as Histograms of the distribution of data for each measure. Field 
(2005) recommended that skewness and kurtosis values that diverge from zero 
may be acceptable if they fall within +/- 1.96 standard errors. Some of the 
measures violated the normality assumptions of parametric analyses on the 
basis of the criteria imposed by Field (2005), as well as significance indicated 
by Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (p < .05) Appropriate transformations were 
applied to the data (Square root, log transformation and inversion), as 
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), in an attempt to produce 
skewness and kurtosis values nearest to zero. Inspection of the transformed 
data revealed little benefit of the transformation, as they did not improve the 
skewness or kurtosis values. Therefore, non-parametric statistical analyses 
were considered as the recommended alternative (Pallant, 2010); although less 
powerful than parametric analyses, the non-parametric alternative imposes 
less stringent criteria on the distribution of the data.
A non-parametric alternative for an analysis of covariance (rank 
analysis of covariance) is outlined by Quade (1967); the results from the 
analysis of the MCQ-30 were consistent with the reported Wilcoxon tests (see 
Appendix 13, which indicated no differences between the two conditions). 
The Wilcoxon test results were favoured in the report, as the method for 
analysis is more established and widely reported than the rank analysis of 
covariance. In addition, the Wilcoxon test provided information about the 
difference between pre and post scores within each condition. Given the 
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characteristics of the data in the current research, it is difficult to conclude 
whether the observed reduction in meta-cognitive beliefs resulted from effects 
of the study or from regression to the mean; future work should aim to 
replicate the effect and extend the current method to the wider population. A 
broad nonclinical sample would be more likely to produce data that was 
normally distributed, which would allow parametric analyses to be applied.
The sample in the current research was selected to represent a 
population at risk of developing OCD based upon endorsement of meta-
cognitive beliefs. However, the mean pre MCQ-30 scores of the current 
sample were elevated above that previously reported for individuals with 
OCD (64.37; Solem, Håland, Vogel, Hansen, & Wells, 2009), which may 
account for the lack of effect from normalising information as the intervention 
may have been insufficient to target the strength of meta-cognitive beliefs. 
The screening criteria for the current research may have resulted in a sample 
of individuals with clinical levels of meta-cognitive beliefs; however, the 
proportion of participants screened in to the study (68.52%) was not in line 
with the incidence rate of OCD (2-3%; Karno, Golding, Sorenso, & Burnam, 
1988). In addition, the mean pre LOI-SF scores for the current sample 
suggested that the percentage of individuals with probable OCD (3.38%) was 
similar to that previously reported from a university sample (2.1%; Mathews, 
Jang, Hami, & Stein, 2004). Exclusion of participants with extreme scores on 
the MCQ-30 and LOI-SF (outliers) did not affect the results obtained. Future 
research could relax the screening criteria for a replication study, and 
investigate the effects of normalising information with participants with 
scores within one standard deviation above the mean of previous nonclinical 
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samples on the MCQ-30 (i.e. range of 48.41 – 61.72; Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004).
The results from the empirical paper did not support the hypothesised 
reduction effects of normalising information on OCD symptoms. The pattern 
of obsessionality scores in the sample of the current research indicated a 
sample high in obsessionality compared to previous research (Mathews, Jang, 
Hami, & Stein, 2004), thus the stability of scores from pre to post is unlikely 
to be due to a lack of symptoms in the sample. Methodological limitations of 
the study design may explain the lack of effect on symptoms. For example, 
the time-scale of the current research may have precluded significant effects 
on symptomatology; changes in well-practised behavioural symptoms of 
OCD, such as compulsions and rituals, may require longer than two weeks to 
manifest. The inclusion of further assessment time points in future research 
could clarify whether there are delayed effects on symptom levels.
Limitations in the measurement of symptoms may have precluded 
detection of subtle effects of normalising information: The measure of OCD 
symptoms used in the study (LOI-SF) was a measure of presence of 
symptoms, and did not include an indication of severity. The LOI-SF was 
chosen for this study as it is a short measurement that is easily administered 
without the presence of a researcher, in comparison to other self-report 
measures of OCD symptoms (e.g. Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale –
Self Report; Y-BOCS-SR, which includes the assessment of 58 symptoms, 
and analysis of six specified symptoms through a further ten questions). The 
LOI-SF has demonstrated good internal consistency and discriminant validity 
(Mathews, Jang, Hami, & Stein, 2004); however, there is little knowledge on 
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further psychometric properties of relevance (e.g. test-retest reliability) and of 
the sensitivity to treatment effects. Many self-report measures of OCD 
symptoms carry unique advantages and disadvantages; Grabill et al. (2008) 
discussed the relative merits of nine different measures, including an omission 
of specific symptoms, a lack of psychometric data and data on treatment 
effects. Future research should include multiple measures of OCD symptoms 
to account for shortfalls of one specific measure alone. The inclusion of more 
extensive measurements of OCD symptoms was beyond the scope of the 
current research, as a brief and easy to complete self-report measure was 
required to avoid high attrition rates and to fit with the online design of the 
study. In addition the main aim of the current research was to reduce 
problematic meta-cognitive beliefs; therefore, OCD symptoms were a 
secondary dependent variable. Future research focussed on the effects of 
psychoeduation on different aspects of OCD symptoms can extend the current 
research, for example a measure of symptom severity would supplement the 
LOI-SF, such as the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa, Kozak, 
Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998), which has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties and published clinical cut-off scores can be used to 
indicate diagnostic symptom levels. 
The difference in the observed results for OCD symptoms (LOI-SF) 
and meta-cognitive beliefs (MCQ-30) are inconsistent with the proposed role 
of meta-cognitions in OCD: participants reported elevated endorsements of 
meta-cognitive beliefs to beyond the level of previous clinical samples (e.g. 
Solem, Håland, Vogel, Hansen, & Wells, 2009), whereas symptom levels 
were below the cut-off indicative of clinical status (Mathews, Jang, Hami, & 
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Stein, 2004). In addition, the observed reduction in meta-cognitive beliefs was 
followed by a reduction in symptoms. Although the direct relationship 
between symptoms and meta-cognitions was not assessed in the current 
research, the different pattern of results for each measure appear to be 
contrary to previous research that has demonstrated an association between 
OCD symptoms and meta-cognitive beliefs (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998).  
This inconsistency could be accounted for by a difference in the measurement 
of symptoms, as the aspect of symptomatology assessed differs; whereas the 
current research investigated effects on symptom presence, Wells and 
Papageorgiou employed the Padua Inventory (PI-WSUR, Burns et al., 1996), 
which assesses the degree of distress associated with OCD symptoms. The 
presence of symptoms may not relate to meta-cognitions in the same way that 
degree of distress caused does. The current research did not include a measure 
of distress associated with symptoms; however, as previously suggested, 
future research might include multiple measures of OCD symptoms that could 
address different aspects of symptomatology.
Salkovskis’ (1985) theory of OCD suggested that responsibility beliefs 
are key in the misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts and development of 
OCD; although responsibility beliefs are alluded to on the MCQ-30 (Item 6: 
‘if I did not control a worrying thought, and then it happened, it would be my 
fault’), a full assessment of responsibility beliefs was not included. Rather, the 
current research focussed on meta-cognitive beliefs, which included many 
beliefs thought to influence the development of OCD, such as thought-action 
fusion (Rachman, 1997, 1998) and beliefs about the control of thoughts 
(Wells & Mathews, 1994; Wells, 1997). Previous research has supported the 
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unique contribution of meta-cognitive beliefs, over responsibility beliefs, in 
the development of OCD: the relationship between responsibility beliefs and 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms was accounted for by meta-cognitive beliefs 
(Gwilliam, Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), and suggested to be a by-
product of meta-cognitive processing (Myers & Wells, 2005). Meta-cognitive 
beliefs therefore represent a sensible target for early intervention. A full 
assessment of all beliefs was not within the aims of the current research; 
however, a comparison of normalising effects on the different beliefs 
suggested to play a role in OCD would add to the current literature that 
compares their relative contributions to symptomatology. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the effects on different beliefs with associated effects on OCD 
symptoms, might help to further understanding on the development and 
maintenance of OCD, and clarify the accuracy of existing cognitive models of 
the disorder.
A further methodological limitation of the current research includes 
external validity. Students have previously been shown to score higher on 
measures of general distress compared to a community sample (OCCWG, 
2003). The application of the screening criteria for the current research within 
a community population would obtain a similar sample in terms of the 
variables of interest. However, the demographics of the sample in the current 
research were not considered, for example ethnicity and educational level, 
which prevents of the generalisability of the findings to different populations. 
Future research could consider possible cultural differences through extension 
of the investigation of normalisation of intrusive thoughts to a more diverse 
sample. 
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3.2 Implications of research
The research presented within this thesis has wider implications for research 
and clinical practice, including an indication of potential areas for future 
directions in research. In order to extend the current research toward the 
development of an effective early intervention for OCD, it is necessary to 
understand the development of “normal” intrusive thoughts to clinical 
obsessions. Thus, the difference between clinical and nonclinical intrusive 
thoughts merits further attention. Longitudinal studies could track the progress 
of the differences in intrusive thoughts currently suggested by the literature; 
for example, frequency, severity, appraisals and beliefs about intrusive 
thoughts, as well as symptoms, could be assessed at yearly intervals in a large 
sample of young people for the duration of an ‘at risk’ age (e.g. 18-25; Karno, 
Golding, Sorenso, & Burnam, 1988). The prevalence rate of OCD in adults 
(2-3%; Karno, Golding, Sorenso, & Burnam, 1988) would mean that a very 
large sample would be required in order to collect sufficient data to draw 
conclusions about the most influential factors in the development of OCD. In 
a prospective study of a university sample (aged 18-59 years), Myers, Fisher 
and Wells (2009) demonstrated that meta-cognitive beliefs predicted 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms over the course of three months. Similar 
prospective studies could correlate a wide battery of measures to assess the 
predictive power of aspects of intrusive thoughts (e.g. frequency, form), in 
addition to beliefs about these thoughts, in OCD symptoms. Such prospective 
studies could extend the time between assessments to further assess changes 
over the course of a year or two.  
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Alternatively, further research that directly compares nonclinical 
individuals and OCD sufferers on dimensions of intrusive thoughts could 
clarify which differences are most explanatory of OCD. The literature review 
in this thesis discussed previous research comparing nonclinical samples to 
those with OCD; significant differences in frequency and severity of intrusive 
thoughts have been demonstrated, as well as differences in the relative 
proportions of intrusive thoughts that have an identifiable trigger, and those 
that are truly spontaneous (Lee & Kwon, 2003; Julien et al., 2009). Future 
research should work to clarify the relationship between these observed 
differences and the beliefs purported to have a role in the development of 
OCD.
Causal direction could be inferred through experimental manipulation, 
for example, the effects of different intrusive thoughts, considered more and 
less severe, could be assessed on different beliefs, such as meta-cognitive and 
responsibility beliefs. In a recent thought suppression experiment, Corcoran 
and Woody (2009) compared the effects of suppressing blasphemous thoughts 
by religious and non-religious participants. Similar manipulations could be 
applied to obsessional intrusive thoughts in order to assess the effects of 
severity on beliefs. The manipulation of frequency of intrusive thoughts poses 
a challenge to future research; however, participants could be divided into 
high and low frequency groups according to self-report, and comparisons of 
their subsequent endorsement of different beliefs could be made. 
Psychoeducational interventions for OCD have been shown to be more 
effective with increased specificity of the information to specific beliefs (e.g. 
Zucker, Craske, Barrios & Holguin, 2002). Therefore with an improved 
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understanding of which beliefs are key in the development of OCD, and their 
relationship with differences in frequency, severity, and triggers, would allow 
early interventions to be targeted to features of intrusive thoughts that confer 
vulnerability to OCD.
The possibility that the observed effects in the current research were 
due to repeated completion of questionnaires about dimensions relating to 
mental health has potential implications for Clinical Psychology practice. 
Questionnaire measures of symptoms and diaries used during the assessment 
process may have therapeutic benefits for the individual and may serve to 
disrupt maintaining processes of OCD. As future research clarifies the relative 
effects of symptom monitoring and normalisation, then clinical practice may 
develop in parallel. For example, future considerations for clinical practice 
may include a standard period of time between assessment and therapy in 
order to allow potential normalising effects of regular symptom monitoring. 
Previous research has suggested that symptoms of OCD may dissipate with 
time in those of a vulnerable age (adolescent/young adult; Mathews et al., 
2004). The LOI-SF scores in the current research support this conjecture; as 
many individuals indicated the presence of obsessional symptoms, but very 
few reached the cut off considered indicative of OCD. Therefore, many young 
adults may experience symptoms of OCD, without developing to clinical 
levels. ‘Watchful waiting’ is a term used within health settings to describe an 
allowed period of time prior to intervention; mild depression is sometimes 
treated in this manner within the National Health Service (NHS) in the United 
Kingdom (NHS, 2011). The effectiveness of watchful waiting periods for 
symptoms of depression has been shown to be minimal in those seeking 
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treatment in primary care and mediated by avoidant coping styles (Hegel, 
Oxman, Hull, Swain, & Swick, 2006); however, research on the potential 
benefits of watchful waiting for those with mild symptoms of OCD, in 
particular young adults, is required. An alternative to watchful waiting could 
be a period of ‘active waiting’, during which the individual could engage in 
symptom monitoring. The effects of watchful waiting, symptom monitoring 
and psychoeducation as stand-alone interventions require further research in 
order to clarify the most effective approach to ‘sub-clinical’ or mild levels of 
OCD.
Intrusive thoughts are a key feature in OCD, but are also characteristic 
of other mental health disorders, such as Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD), Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; Brewin, 
1998; Purdon, 1999; Green, 2003; Watkins, 2004). Thus the development of 
an effective early intervention for OCD has implications for the prevention 
and intervention with other disorders. An effective intervention for intrusive 
thoughts based on psychoeducation could span a number of clinical disorders; 
however, potential differences between disorders should be taken into 
consideration and psychoeducation information adapted to be specific. 
Previous research on intrusive thoughts in clinical disorders suggests that they 
are more frequent, unpleasant and uncontrollable in OCD compared to 
depression and other anxiety disorders (Morillo, Belloch, and García-Soriano, 
2007). Future research should continue to examine the potential differences in 
the experience of intrusive thoughts between clinical disorders in order to 
determine whether they might be treated in the same manner, or whether their 
respective features require different treatment approaches. Future work might 
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consider a continuum framework of disorders, and focus on the comparison of 
clinical symptoms with similar ‘normal’ experiences. Such an understanding 
could help to develop a normalising approach within mental health, and could 
potentially serve to reduce the stigma associated with a range of mental health 
problems.
3.3 Reflections
The process of conducting the current research was an excellent professional 
development experience for the researcher. The difficulties and successes 
encountered allowed the researcher to build upon existing skills, and develop 
new skills. Reflection upon the methodological choices made highlights 
alternative solutions, which can inform future research and practice; a 
discussion of the researcher’s experience follows.
Previous experience of doctoral level research in Psychology afforded 
the researcher a good grounding in applied psychology, including knowledge 
and skills in quantitative research methods. The researcher was able to extend 
previous research conducted within Cognitive Psychology to a study with 
clinical implications, and thus develop further a keen interest in intrusive 
thoughts. A familiarity with research on intrusive thoughts aided the 
researcher in developing ideas for the current study, in collaboration with the 
supervisor. In particular, the researcher included measures of reactions to 
intrusive thoughts (EBRIQ) and experiential avoidance (AAQ), in order to 
test whether normalising information may impact how the individual responds 
to their intrusive thoughts in a broader sense. In addition, the researcher’s 
previous research included the use of the internet to develop a questionnaire 
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measure of intrusive thoughts, which allowed the application of existing skills 
to create a database for the collation of online data files.
The process of the current research has also allowed the researcher to 
gain new skills and knowledge. The researcher’s knowledge about the 
cognitive factors relating to OCD was developed, specifically, knowledge 
about the cognitive models of OCD and an increased awareness of self-report 
measurement of OCD symptoms and the application of these within research. 
Upon reflection and with a broader knowledge of the measures of obsessive 
symptoms, the researcher can consider the benefit of assessing different 
aspects of OCD symptomatology, for example measures of symptom severity 
(Y-BOCS-SR) and associated distress (PI-WSUR) would add to the measure 
used (LOI-SF). Multiple measures were considered inappropriate within the 
design of the current research, as increased length of assessment time would 
potentially impact attrition rate through the study.
The process of conducting the current research also allowed the 
researcher to develop skills in quantitative research with clinical implications; 
through the planning stages, the researcher learned that it is important to 
consider the impact of the study on clinical practice and to develop aims 
accordingly. The researcher also developed more generic skills in time 
management and organisation; for example, in order to write the current 
research into a thesis it was necessary to carefully plan available time and set 
regular deadlines, which helped the researcher to mark achievements and keep 
track of progress.
The researcher was challenged to develop further skills and knowledge 
in order to overcome specific difficulties encountered during the process of
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the research; for example, difficulties with recruitment necessitated a re-
design of the study part way through the research process. The initial design 
of the study included recruitment from an adolescent population (12-16 
years); a plan to recruit through schools was implemented. Secondary schools 
within the North of England were contacted by email and telephone and asked 
to help with the research by allowing the researcher to promote the study to 
their pupils. Unfortunately the initial part of this strategy was unsuccessful 
and no schools were able to provide help with recruitment: The timing of the 
project was cited as the main reason for schools being unable to participate, as 
many were entering an exam period, followed by summer holidays. A 
solution to this difficulty was decided between the researcher and supervisor; 
and online recruitment via advertising on ‘Facebook’ (the online social 
networking site) was subsequently pursued. Ethical approval for this 
amendment was gained. The advert was targeted to individuals aged 13-16 
years on Facebook, and gained 1,645,103 impressions within the profiles of 
those that met the age criteria. Within the course of four weeks, the advert 
attracted 557 ‘clicks’ (individuals that clicked the advert were directed to the 
study ‘homepage’, which contained further information on the study); 15 
individuals registered to participate in the study, of which only 5 were 
screened in and randomised to a condition. Therefore the researcher and 
supervisor concluded that advertising through Facebook was not an efficient 
form of recruitment for the current research. The researcher reinvested 
recruitment energies into continued contact with schools at the start of a new 
school year; however, there was limited uptake. Eighty-three schools were
contacted; two schools allowed the researcher to promote the study to pupils 
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during assembly; fifteen pupils registered to participate in the study and three 
were screened in.
The researcher had previous experience of successful recruitment to an 
online study via University webpages; therefore, the decision was made to 
alter the age range of the target population in order to include undergraduate 
students at the University of Manchester and thus allow recruitment through 
the University’s volunteering webpages. The undergraduate student 
population represented an age at high risk of developing OCD, and an 
appropriate limitation on age was selected (18-20 years) in order to capture 
individuals for whom a preventative intervention might be most effective. 
Due to the alteration in the target population, further changes to the study 
were also necessary: the adult versions of the Meta-cognitions Questionnaire 
(MCQ-30) and Leyton Obsessional Inventory (LOI-SF) replaced the child 
versions (MCQ-A; LOI-CV). In addition, ethical approval was sought for an 
amendment to the study by re-submission of a revised protocol to the School 
of Psychological Studies ethical committee. Following these changes, 
recruitment to the study was successful for participants aged 18-20 years; 
within three months of advertising the research on the University volunteering 
webpage a sufficient number of participants (n = 216 completed screening; n 
= 148 screened into the second phase of study) had completed the study.
Upon reflection on the recruitment process for an adolescent sample, it 
is disappointing that modern possibilities (e.g. Facebook) were not successful. 
Although the advert was accessed, this did not translate into completed 
participants. Two possible reasons for this drop in numbers were considered. 
Firstly, potential participants were not offered an incentive for completing the 
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study. Many advertisements on Facebook offer an incentive for the 
completion of surveys such as a prize draw for money or valuable items. 
However, ethical considerations prevented the inclusion of payment for 
adolescent participants. In addition, the length and formality of the study may 
have discouraged potential participants from taking part, as this presentation 
is inconsistent with the usual informality of Facebook. Participants were 
asked to provide parental consent, as well as their own assent, to participate in 
the study. The necessary dual consent may have been a barrier to adolescents 
registering to take part in the research, as they may not want their parents to 
monitor their access on the internet. Although, recruitment of adolescents may 
have been more successful if parental consent were not necessary for under 16 
years, this would instigate ethical concerns about the control that parents have
over their child’s welfare. 
Recruitment within schools may have been more successful with 
increased time. The study may have required further adjustments to encourage 
pupils to participate; for example, rather than an online presentation that 
participants access at home, an alternative may be for a paper or hard disk 
based version that could be conducted within the school. The current research 
was time limited and did not allow for these adjustments; however, future 
research in this area may consider alternative formats and designs in order to 
maximise recruitment of an adolescent sample.
A large sample was afforded through online recruitment of 
undergraduate students; however, this design led to a high attrition rate and 
resultant missing data. Pairwise deletion of cases during statistical analyses 
allowed a resolution for the problem of missing data, which maintained the 
108
maximum amount of data within each analysis. The attrition rate of the 
current research highlights an ethical benefit of online research for the 
participant; participants may feel less obligation or pressure to complete the 
study and therefore more readily withdraw. However, the rate of withdrawal 
may not accurately reflect the proportion of people that no longer wish to 
participate, but rather may be a product of the setting conditions in which they 
are participating. The increased accessibility of the internet within modern 
culture may have resulted in some participants accessing the study in less than 
ideal circumstances, which may have been a hindrance to participating in the 
study through to the end. For example, participants may have accessed the 
study in public places, such as the library, and been disturbed when 
attempting to participate. The attrition rate may be reduced in future online 
research by consideration of the setting conditions; for example, provision of 
an appropriate environment for individuals to access the study, or stating that 
privacy and quiet may be required to complete the study. An alternative 
reason why individuals may have withdrawn before completing the study is 
that the questionnaire measures used were too long (the MCQ-30 and LOI-SF 
were the longest measures, with thirty items each). Future studies could make 
use of brief but valid measures; existing measures could be developed to be 
shorter, or idiosyncratic measures could be developed to capture the variable 
of interest, for example one question that assesses a particular meta-cognitive 
belief, such as thought-action fusion. The advantage of briefer measures on 
retention rates within research must be considered alongside the potential loss 
of detail, which would be obtained from longer, more extensive measures.
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The response rate to the two-week follow-up may be considered to be 
low, and representing a limitation to the research presented. Those 
participants that responded at follow-up may not accurately represent the 
population of interest, or the sample at time of intervention. Those individuals 
lost to follow-up may have been less motivated to complete the study, and 
may have shown a difference in the observed outcome compared to those 
participants that did respond at follow-up.  Higher levels of concern about 
intrusive thoughts may have motivated follow-up respondents, which could 
also bias the observed outcome. Therefore statistical analyses were conducted 
to confirm whether the two sub-groups differed on pre and post measures; 
non-significant results indicated that the groups were similar at the first two 
time points. 
A high drop out rate is a common problem of internet-based health 
research; Eysenbach (2005) specifically referred to high drop out rates as a 
“natural and typical feature” of internet-based trials, particularly self-help 
applications (p.e11). High rates of attrition have been reported by previous 
internet-based health research; for example 1% and 0.5% of two samples 
completed self-help trials for panic disorder (Farvolden, Denisoff, Selby, 
Bagby, & Rudy 2005) and for depression (Christensen, Griffiths, Korten, 
Brittliffe, & Groves, 2005) respectively. Similarly low response rates at 
follow-up have previously been reported within internet-based studies, for 
example, 35% of a sample completed one-month and two-month follow-up 
questionnaires within an online smoking-cessation trial (Etter, 2005). 
Differences in the length of the current and previous studies may account for 
differences in attrition; for example, the trial reported by Farvolden et al. 
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consisted of 12-weekly sessions of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. However, 
the low retention and follow-up response reported within previous research is 
illustrative of the difficulties with retaining participants within internet-based 
research. Eysenbach described “the law of attrition” as a “fundamental 
characteristic and methodological challenge” of online health trials and 
purported that a possible solution may be to “weed out” participants that have 
been randomised to the intervention group who will not want to continue with 
it (p.e11). Future online research may consider the use of such a method of 
selection; the possible selection bias that may result would require 
consideration when interpreting results. However, the success of any 
intervention is dependent upon the target population gaining access; perhaps a 
consideration for internet-based interventions is whether the willingness to 
commit to an internet-based trial is a necessary characteristic of the target 
population.
The general success of recruitment via the internet in the current 
research illustrates the potential for online research; the internet provides a 
means of reaching a wide audience and therefore has great potential for 
psychological research. However, further work on the effectiveness of 
different methodologies is warranted. The current approach is to apply 
existing quantitative methods to this new forum; perhaps it would be a fruitful 
line of research to investigate the relative success of these methods (e.g. 
questionnaire, intervention), and consider the possibility of developing new 
specific research methods for online research. The success of online 
communities and online social networks may be a valuable source of 
information in how to conduct psychology research online, indicating the 
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ways in which people access the internet and for what purpose. In addition, 
collaborations between psychologists and computer/internet experts may be 
beneficial to the development of psychological research in the modern age. In 
light of the current research, it is evident that the internet offers a means for 
large-scale or public-level interventions. If early interventions for OCD, such 
as psychoeducation and normalisation, are shown to be successful, further 
research could assess the effectiveness of delivery via the internet to large 
samples.
3.4 Summary
This thesis investigated the continuum of intrusive thoughts to obsessions; the 
work presented represents a developed understanding of obsessive intrusive 
thoughts and a test of an intervention aimed at normalising intrusive thoughts 
in a sample of individuals with high levels of problematic meta-cognitive 
beliefs. The literature review (paper one) provided the context and 
background to the empirical work by exploring the experience of intrusive 
thoughts in the nonclinical population. The empirical work (paper two) 
expanded on previous research on psychoeducation and the effects of this 
information on beliefs about intrusive thoughts. The findings of an overall 
reduction in meta-cognitive beliefs, but no benefit of the normalising 
information, were discussed within the context of symptom monitoring and 
regression to the mean. The work presented within this thesis extends the 
research on intrusive thoughts, and suggests future directions for both 
research and clinical practice.
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the complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number and e-mail 
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standardization of assessment and treatment replications, authors of clinical 
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Blind Review
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order forms are sent with proofs.
Springer Open Choice
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will publish as regular subscription-model articles. We regret that Springer 
Open Choice cannot be ordered for published articles: 
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Introduction
Behaviour Research and Therapy encompasses all of what is 
commonly referred to as cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT). The focus is on 
the following: theoretical and experimental analyses of psychopathological 
processes with direct implications for prevention and treatment; the 
development and evaluation of empirically-supported interventions; 
predictors, moderators and mechanisms of behaviour change; and 
dissemination and implementation of evidence-based treatments to general 
clinical practice. In addition to traditional clinical disorders, the scope of the 
journal also includes behavioural medicine. The journal will not consider 
manuscripts dealing primarily with measurement, psychometric analyses, and 
personality assessment. 
The Editor and Associate Editors will make an initial determination of 
whether or not submissions fall within the scope of the journal and/or are of 
sufficient merit and importance to warrant full review. 
Contact details
Any questions regarding your submission should be addressed to the 
Editor in Chief: 
Professor G. T. Wilson 
Psychological Clinic at Gordon Road 
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The State University of New Jersey 
41C Gordon Road 
Piscataway 
New Jersey 
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USA 
Email: brat@rci.rutgers.edu 
Before you begin:
Ethics in Publishing 
For information on Ethics in Publishing and Ethical guidelines for 
journal publication see: http://www.elsevier.com/publishingethics and 
http://www.elsevier.com/ethicalguidelines. 
Conflict of interest 
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Submission declaration 
Submission of an article implies that the work described has not been 
published previously (except in the form of an abstract or as part of a 
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publication elsewhere, that its publication is approved by all authors and 
tacitly or explicitly by the responsible authorities where the work was carried 
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Article structure 
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given a brief heading. Each heading should appear on its own separate line. 
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Provide the full postal address of each affiliation, including the country name, 
and, if available, the e-mail address of each author. 
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author's name. The address at which the author actually did the work must be 
retained as the main, affiliation address. Superscript Arabic numerals are used 
for such footnotes. 
Abstract 
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separately from the article, so it must be able to stand-alone. For this reason, 
References should be avoided, but if essential, then cite the author(s) and 
year(s). Also, non-standard or uncommon abbreviations should be avoided, 
but if essential they must be defined at their first mention in the abstract itself. 
Graphical abstract 
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the article in a concise, pictorial form designed to capture the attention of a 
wide readership online. Authors must provide images that clearly represent 
the work described in the article. Graphical abstracts should be submitted as a 
separate file in the online submission system. Image size: Please provide an 
image with a minimum of 531 x 1328 pixels (h x w) or proportionally more. 
The image should be readable at a size of 5 x 13 cm using a regular screen 
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Keywords 
Immediately after the abstract, provide a maximum of 6 keywords, to 
be chosen from the APA list of index descriptors. These keywords will be 
used for indexing purposes. 
Abbreviations 
Define abbreviations that are not standard in this field in a footnote to 
be placed on the first page of the article. Such abbreviations that are 
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as in the footnote. Ensure consistency of abbreviations throughout the article. 
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• Provide captions to illustrations separately. 
• Produce images near to the desired size of the printed version. 
• Submit each figure as a separate file. 
A detailed guide on electronic artwork is available on our website: 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions 
You are urged to visit this site; some excerpts from the detailed 
information are given here. 
Formats 
Regardless of the application used, when your electronic artwork is 
finalised, please "save as" or convert the images to one of the following 
formats (note the resolution requirements for line drawings, halftones, and 
line/halftone combinations given below): 
EPS: Vector drawings. Embed the font or save the text as "graphics". 
TIFF: color or grayscale photographs (halftones): always use a 
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TIFF: Bitmapped line drawings: use a minimum of 1000 dpi. 
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minimum of 500 dpi is required. 
If your electronic artwork is created in a Microsoft Office application 
(Word, PowerPoint, Excel) then please supply "as is". 
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Please do not: 
• Supply files that are optimised for screen use (like GIF, BMP, PICT, 
WPG); the resolution is too low; 
• Supply files that are too low in resolution; 
• Submit graphics that are disproportionately large for the content. 
Tables 
Number tables consecutively in accordance with their appearance in 
the text. Place footnotes to tables below the table body and indicate them with 
superscript lowercase letters. Avoid vertical rules. Be sparing in the use of 
tables and ensure that the data presented in tables do not duplicate results 
described elsewhere in the article. 
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Citation in text 
Please ensure that every reference cited in the text is also present in 
the reference list (and vice versa). Any references cited in the abstract must be 
given in full. Unpublished results and personal communications are not 
recommended in the reference list, but may be mentioned in the text. If these 
references are included in the reference list they should follow the standard 
reference style of the journal and should include a substitution of the 
publication date with either "Unpublished results" or "Personal 
communication" Citation of a reference as "in press" implies that the item has 
been accepted for publication. 
Web references 
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As a minimum, the full URL should be given and the date when the 
reference was last accessed. Any further information, if known (DOI, author 
names, dates, reference to a source publication, etc.), should also be given. 
Web references can be listed separately (e.g., after the reference list) under a 
different heading if desired, or can be included in the reference list.
Reference management software 
This journal has standard templates available in key reference 
management packages EndNote 
(http://www.endnote.com/support/enstyles.asp) and Reference Manager 
(http://refman.com/support/rmstyles.asp). Using plug-ins to word-processing 
packages, authors only need to select the appropriate journal template when 
preparing their article and the list of references and citations to these will be 
formatted according to the journal style which is described below. 
Reference style 
Text: Citations in the text should follow the referencing style used by 
the American Psychological Association. You are referred to the Publication 
Manual of the American Psychological Association, Sixth Edition, ISBN 978-
1-4338-0561-5, copies of which may be ordered from 
http://books.apa.org/books.cfm?id=4200067 or APA Order Dept., P.O.B. 
2710, Hyattsville, MD 20784, USA or APA, 3 Henrietta Street, London, 
WC3E 8LU, UK. Details concerning this referencing style can also be found 
at: http://linguistics.byu.edu/faculty/henrichsenl/apa/apa01.html. 
List: references should be arranged first alphabetically and then further 
sorted chronologically if necessary. More than one reference from the same 
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placed after the year of publication. 
Examples: 
Reference to a journal publication: 
Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J. A. J., & Lupton, R. A. (2000). The art of 
writing a scientific article. Journal of Scientific Communications, 163, 
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of your article. In B. S. Jones, & R. Z. Smith (Eds.), Introduction to 
the electronic age (pp. 281–304). New York: E-Publishing Inc. 
Video data 
Elsevier accepts video material and animation sequences to support 
and enhance your scientific research. Authors who have video or animation 
files that they wish to submit with their article are strongly encouraged to 
include these within the body of the article. This can be done in the same way 
as a figure or table by referring to the video or animation content and noting 
in the body text where it should be placed. All submitted files should be 
properly labelled so that they directly relate to the video file's content. In order 
to ensure that your video or animation material is directly usable, please 
provide the files in one of our recommended file formats with a preferred 
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published online in the electronic version of your article in Elsevier Web 
products, including ScienceDirect: http://www.sciencedirect.com. Please 
supply 'stills' with your files: you can choose any frame from the video or 
animation or make a separate image. These will be used instead of standard 
icons and will personalize the link to your video data. For more detailed 
instructions please visit our video instruction pages at: 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions. 
Note: since video and animation cannot be embedded in the print 
version of the journal, please provide text for both the electronic and the print 
version for the portions of the article that refer to this content. 
Supplementary data 
Elsevier accepts electronic supplementary material to support and 
enhance your scientific research. 
Supplementary files offer the author additional possibilities to publish 
supporting applications, high-resolution images, background datasets, sound 
clips and more. Supplementary files supplied will be published online 
alongside the electronic version of your article in Elsevier Web products, 
including ScienceDirect: http://www.sciencedirect.com. In order to ensure 
that your submitted material is directly usable, please provide the data in one 
of our recommended file formats. Authors should submit the material in 
electronic format together with the article and supply a concise and 
descriptive caption for each file. For more detailed instructions please visit 
our artwork instruction pages at: http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions. 
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The following list will be useful during the final checking of an article 
prior to sending it to the journal for review. Please consult this Guide for 
Authors for further details of any item. 
Ensure that the following items are present: 
One Author designated as corresponding Author:
• E-mail address 
• Full postal address 
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All necessary files have been uploaded 
• Keywords 
• All figure captions 
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• Manuscript has been "spellchecked" and "grammar-checked" 
• References are in the correct format for this journal 
• All references mentioned in the Reference list are cited in the text, 
and vice versa.
• Permission has been obtained for use of copyrighted material from 
other sources (including the Web).
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reproduction on the Web (free of charge) and in print or to be reproduced in 
color on the Web (free of charge) and in black-and-white in print.
• If only color on the Web is required, black and white versions of the 
figures are also supplied for printing purposes.
For any further information please visit our customer support site at: 
http://support.elsevier.com. 
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The Digital Object Identifier (DOI) may be used to cite and link to 
electronic documents. The DOI consists of a unique alpha-numeric character 
string which is assigned to a document by the publisher upon the initial 
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format for citing a DOI is shown as follows (example taken from a document 
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One set of page proofs (as PDF files) will be sent by e-mail to the 
corresponding author (if we do not have an e-mail address then paper proofs 
will be sent by post) or, a link will be provided in the e-mail so that authors 
can download the files themselves. Elsevier now provides authors with PDF 
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Reader version 7 (or higher) available free from http://get.adobe.com/reader. 
Instructions on how to annotate PDF files will accompany the proofs (also 
given online). The exact system requirements are given at the Adobe site: 
http://www.adobe.com/products/reader/tech-specs.html. 
If you do not wish to use the PDF annotations function, you may list 
the corrections (including replies to the Query Form) and return them to 
Elsevier in an e-mail. Please list your corrections quoting line number. If, for 
any reason, this is not possible, then mark the corrections and any other 
comments (including replies to the Query Form) on a printout of your proof 
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proof only for checking the typesetting, editing, completeness and correctness 
of the text, tables and figures. Significant changes to the article as accepted 
for publication will only be considered at this stage with permission from the 
Editor. We will do everything possible to get your article published quickly 
and accurately – please let us have all your corrections within 48 hours. It is 
important to ensure that all corrections are sent back to us in one 
communication: please check carefully before replying, as inclusion of any 
subsequent corrections cannot be guaranteed. Proofreading is solely your 
responsibility. Note that Elsevier may proceed with the publication of your 
article if no response is received. 
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The corresponding author, at no cost, will be provided with a PDF file 
of the article via e-mail. For an extra charge, paper offprints can be ordered 
via the offprint order form which is sent once the article is accepted for 
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outlining the terms and conditions of use.
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Appendix 2
List of search terms used for literature review
Intrusive thoughts
Non-clinical obsessions
Obsessions
Obsessional thoughts
Cognitive intrusions
Intrusive thoughts AND non-clinical
Obsessive intrusive thoughts
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Appendix 3
Advertisement for Recruitment
Posting subject (title):
Coping with intrusive thoughts
Details:
We are looking for people aged 18-20 years to take part in an online 
questionnaire study about intrusive thoughts. Those who take part will be 
entered into a prize draw to win one of three £20 cash prizes!
Intrusive thoughts are the kind of thoughts that pop into your head 
unexpectedly. This research looks at young people’s beliefs about intrusive 
thoughts and how they cope with them.
The research is entirely online and involves providing your answers to a 
number of questionnaires. There are three parts to the study:
The first part involves completing four questionnaires about your thoughts 
and how you cope with them; this part will take about 10 minutes.
Eligible individuals will then be asked to complete an online quiz, which will 
take about 10 minutes. After the quiz you will be asked to complete part two 
of the study, which is to complete the same online questionnaires as in part 
one. The third and final part of the study will involve completing those online 
questionnaires again in two weeks time.
All participants in the study will be entered into a prize draw to win one of 
three £20 cash prizes!
If you would like to take part you can follow the link below. On our webpage 
you will find further information about the study, be able to register to take 
part, and get started straight away!
http://www.howteensthing.org.uk
If you would like any further information you can email the experimenter, 
Lisa-Marie Berry:
lisa-marie.berry@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
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Appendix 4
Participant Information Sheet
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Participant Information Sheet
Title of project: Intrusive thinking in young people
Introduction 
Intrusive thoughts are thoughts that pop into your head unexpectedly. People 
have different beliefs about these thoughts, and react differently to them: 
some are upset by them, others are not. This study will look at young people’s 
beliefs about intrusive thoughts and how they cope with having such thoughts.
What will I be asked to do if I take part?
The research is entirely online. Therefore you will complete the study through 
the University webpages. 
Part one: You will be asked to fill in four questionnaires about your 
experience of intrusive thoughts. These questionnaires should take about 
10mins.
The questionnaires include the following questions: 
 When I start worrying I cannot stop
 Are you fussy about keeping your hands clean?”
Project no
588/07p
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 I often catch myself daydreaming about things I've done and what I 
would do differently next time
 My thoughts distract me 
Part two: Straight after the questionnaires, those people that score over our cut 
off on the questionnaires, will be asked to complete an online quiz. The 
answers will then be given to you, so you can see how you did. The quiz 
should take about 10minutes. You will then be asked to fill in the same four 
questionnaires again online. This should take about 10mins.
Part three: Those people that completed part two will be emailed two weeks 
later and asked you to finish the study. This will involve filling in the four 
questionnaires one last time online, which will take about 10mins.
Will my data be confidential?
The questionnaires that you answer in the study will be made anonymous. 
This means that all information that identifies you will be removed from the 
data. The data will be stored securely at all times. It will not be possible for 
anyone to identify you in any report produced from this research.
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to take part in the study.  If you decide to take part you will 
be asked to indicate that you have read this information sheet and consent to 
taking part. If you decide to take part and then later change your mind, either 
before you start the study or during it, you can withdraw without giving 
reason.
Where can I get more information if I need it?
If you want more information about the research or have any questions please 
contact: 
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The experimenter:
Lisa-Marie Berry.
Email: lisa-marie.berry@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
Or the project supervisors:
Dr. Ben Laskey.
Email: blasky@cornwall.gov.uk
Dr. Dan Pratt
Email: daniel.pratt@manchester.ac.uk
Thank you for taking the time to read this information.
This project has been approved by the
School of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee
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Appendix 5
Participant Consent Form
Before you register to take part in this study, we are required to ask you to 
indicate your consent by answering the questions below.
1. Have you read the Participant Information Sheet?
Yes
No
2. Have you received enough information about the study?
Yes
No
3. Do you understand that you do not need to take part in the study and if you 
do enter you are free to withdraw:
 at any time
 without having to give a reason for withdrawing
 and without detriment to you?
Yes
No
4. Do you agree to take part in this study?
Yes
No
To print this page, please click on the print button in your browser.
This project has been approved by the School of Psychological Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee.
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Research Ethics Committee
School of Psychological Sciences
The University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester
M13 9PL
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Appendix 6
Quizzes
Appendix 6a
Control (pet) quiz
A pet is a tamed animal kept for amusement or companionship.
The following 6 webpages make up a quiz based on information about pets in 
the U.K. – you’ll be asked about pets and how common different types are. 
Please read each question carefully and have a go at guessing the answer!
Page one:
What proportion of people in the U.K. said that they have a pet?
Less than 1/4 
Between ¼ and ½
Between ½ and ¾
Over ¾
(Answer: between ¼ and ½)
Can you estimate the percentage of people that said that they have a pet?
(Answer = 43%)
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Page two:
Can you put these different types of pets in their correct category?
Categories:
1. Dog
2. Cat
3. Rabbit
4. Bird
5. Guinea pig
Greyhound (Answer = 1)
Lionhead (Answer = 3)
Budgie (Answer = 4)
Manx (Answer = 2)
Peruvian (Answer = 5)
Holland Lop (Answer = 3)
Bengal (Answer = 2)
Texel (Answer = 5)
Border Collie (Answer = 1)
Cockatiel (Answer = 4)
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Page three:
Please rank order these types of pets according to which are most common in 
the U.K. So that 1 is most common and 5 is least common.
Birds (Answer = 4)
Guinea pigs (Answer = 5)
Dogs (Answer = 1)
Rabbits (Answer = 3)
Cats (Answer = 2)
Page four:
Of all of the pets in the U.K., what percentage are of these types?
Birds (Answer = 1.8%)
Guinea pigs (Answer = 1.3%)
Dogs (Answer = 23%)
Rabbits (Answer = 2.8%)
Cats (Answer = 20%)
Page five:
What was the maximum number of pets people reported having?
(Answer = 5)
What was the most common number of pets people reported having?
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(Answer = 1)
Page six:
What percentage of people in the U.K. do not own any pets?
0-100% (Answer = 67%)
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Appendix 6b
Normalisation quiz
Introduction
Intrusive thoughts are thoughts that pop into your head unexpectedly. People 
have different beliefs about these thoughts, and react differently to them: 
some are upset by them, others are not.
A survey was conducted with a group of young adults about their experience 
of intrusive thoughts. The following 6 webpages make up a quiz based on this 
information – you’ll be asked different questions about how common 
intrusive thoughts are. Please read each question carefully and have a go at 
guessing the answer! The answers will appear so you can check how you’ve 
done.
Page one:
What proportion of young people said that they have intrusive thoughts?
(Please select one answer)
Less than ¼
Between ¼ and ½
Between ½ and ¾
Over ¾
(Answer = over ¾)
Can you estimate what percentage of young people said that they have 
intrusive thoughts?
0 – 100%
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(Answer = 99%)
Page two:
Can you put these different types of intrusive thoughts in their correct 
category?
Categories:
1. Self-doubt
2. Reckless driving
3. Thoughts about sex
4. Thoughts about verbal or physical aggression
5. Thoughts about disease and contamination
An accident resulting from leaving the oven or hob on (Answer = 1)
Running the car off the road (Answer = 2)
Insulting strangers (Answer = 4)
Being robbed due to leaving the house unlocked (Answer = 1)
Thinking about dirt in unseen places (Answer = 5)
Having sex in public (Answer = 3)
Imagining strangers naked (Answer = 3)
Catching a sexually transmitted disease (Answer = 5)
Throwing something (Answer = 4)
Imagining authority figures naked (Answer = 3)
Page three:
Please put the following intrusive thoughts in order of which is most 
164
commonly experienced by people, so that 1 is the least common and 10 is the 
most common.
An accident resulting from leaving the oven or hob on (Answer = 9)
Running the car off the road (Answer = 6)
Insulting strangers (Answer = 5)
Being robbed due to leaving the house unlocked (Answer = 10)
Thinking about dirt in unseen places (Answer = 2)
Having sex in public (Answer = 7)
Imagining strangers naked (Answer = 8)
Catching a sexually transmitted disease (Answer = 4)
Throwing something (Answer = 1)
Imagining authority figures naked (Answer = 3)
Page four:
We asked people which of these intrusive thoughts they commonly 
experienced. Estimate what percentage of people reported having the thought 
(out of 100% for each thought).
An accident resulting from leaving the oven or hob on (Answer = 72%)
Running the car off the road (Answer = 60%)
Insulting strangers (Answer = 55%)
Being robbed due to leaving the house unlocked (Answer = 73%)
Thinking about dirt in unseen places (Answer = 35%)
Having sex in public (Answer = 64%)
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Imagining strangers naked (Answer = 66%)
Catching a sexually transmitted disease (Answer = 52%)
Throwing something (Answer = 27%)
Imagining authority figures naked (Answer = 48%)
Page five:
Out of a list of 52 intrusive thoughts, what was the maximum number of 
intrusive thoughts that women reported having?
(Answer = 21)
And men…
(Answer = 40)
Out of a list of 52 intrusive thoughts, what was the average number of 
intrusive thoughts that women report having?
(Answer = 7)
And men…
(Answer = 8).
Page six:
What percentage of people reported experiencing no intrusive thoughts?
0-100% (Answer = 1%)
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Appendix 7
The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire - 30
Listed below are a number of beliefs that people have about their thoughts.
Please read each item and indicate how much you agree with it by clicking the 
appropriate button.
Please respond to all the items. There are no right or wrong answers.
(Scale: do not agree = 1; agree slightly = 2; agree moderately = 3; agree very 
much = 4)   
1. Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future
2. My worrying is dangerous for me
3. I think a lot about my thoughts
4. I could make myself sick with worrying
5. I am aware of the way my mind works when I am thinking through a 
problem
6. If I did not control a worrying thought, and then it happened, it would 
be my fault
7. I need to worry in order to remain organized
8. I have little confidence in my memory for words and names
9. My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how I try to stop them
10. Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my mind
11. I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts
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12. I monitor my thoughts
13. I should be in control of my thoughts all of the time
14. My memory can mislead me at times
15. My worrying could make me go mad
16. I am constantly aware of my thinking
17. I have a poor memory
18. I pay close attention to the way my mind works
19. Worrying helps me cope
20. Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness
21. When I start worrying, I cannot stop
22. I will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts
23. Worrying helps me to solve problems
24. I have little confidence in my memory for places
25. It is bad to think certain thoughts
26. I do not trust my memory
27. If I could not control my thoughts, I would not be able to function
28. I need to worry, in order to work well
29. I have little confidence in my memory for actions
30. I constantly examine my thoughts
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Appendix 8
The Leyton Obsessional Inventory – Short Form
Please read each question and rate whether it is true or false for you by 
clicking the appropriate button.
There are no right or wrong answers.
(Scale: Yes = 1; No = 0)
(Reverse scored items: 5, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25)
1. I avoid using the public telephone because of possible 
contamination
2. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty getting rid of 
them
3. I am more concerned than most people about honesty
4. I am often late because I can’t seem to get through everything on 
time
5. I don’t worry unduly about contamination if I touch an animal
6. I frequently have to check things; for example, gas or water taps, 
doors, etc., several times
7. I have a very strict conscience
8. I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that 
come into my mind against my will
9. I do not worry unduly if I accidentally bump into somebody
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10. I usually have serious doubts about the simple, everyday things I 
do
11. Neither of my parents was very strict during my childhood
12. I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things over and 
over again
13. I use only an average amount of soap
14. Some numbers are extremely unlucky
15. I do not check letters over and over before mailing them
16. I do not take a long time to dress in the morning
17. I am not excessively concerned about cleanliness
18. One of my major problems is that I pay too much attention to 
detail
19. I can use well-kept toilets without any hesitation
20. My major problem is repeated checking
21. I am not unduly concerned about germs and diseases
22. I do not tend to check things more than once
23. I do not stick to a very strict routine when doing ordinary things
24. My hands do not feel dirty after touching money
25. I do not usually count when doing a routine task
26. I take a rather long time to complete things my washing in the 
morning
27. I do not use a great deal of antiseptics
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28. I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and over again
29. Hanging and folding up my clothes at night does not take up a lot 
of time
30. Even when I do something very carefully, I often feel that it is not 
quite right
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Appendix 9
Emotional and Behavioural Reactions to Intrusions Questionnaire
Intrusive thoughts are spontaneously occurring thoughts that “pop” into your 
head without effort and capture your attention
This question is about how you react to intrusive thoughts.
Please rate each statement using the scale provided (Scale: 0 = never; 4 = 
every time)
When you have an intrusive thought, how often do each of the following 
statements apply:
1. It makes me feel I am losing control of my thoughts
2. It makes me feel miserable
3. It distracts me from what I am doing
4. I act on the thought
5. It makes me anxious
6. It interferes with how well I carry out what I’m doing
7. It makes me irritable
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Appendix 10
The Action and Acceptance Questionnaire
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate your to what extent you 
agree with each statement as it applies to you. Use the following scale to 
make your choice.
(Scale: 1 = never true, 2 = very rarely true, 3 = seldom true, 4 = sometimes 
true, 5 = frequently true, 6 = almost always true, 7 = always true)
(Scoring: 1, 4, 5, 6 reverse coded. Total of all items)
1. I am able to take action on a problem even if I am uncertain what is 
the right thing to do.
2. I often catch myself daydreaming about things I've done and what I 
would do differently next time. 
3. When I feel depressed or anxious, I am unable to take care of my 
responsibilities. 
4. I rarely worry about getting my anxieties, worries, and feelings under 
control. 
5. I'm not afraid of my feelings. 
6. When I evaluate something negatively, I usually recognize that this is 
just a reaction, not an objective fact. 
7. When I compare myself to other people, it seems that most of them are 
handling their lives better than I do.
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8. Anxiety is bad. 
9. If I could magically remove all the painful experiences I've had in my 
life, I would do so.
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Appendix 11
Means Plots
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Figure 2. Mean MCQ-30 total scores over time by condition
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Figure 3. Mean LOI-SF score over time by condition
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Figure 4. Mean EBRIQ score over time by condition
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Figure 5. Mean AAQ score over time by condition.
176
Appendix 12
Preliminary Analysis: Normality Assessment
Table 2. Normality assessment
Measure Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (df)
Pre MCQ-30
Control .42 (.28) -.34 (.56) .08 (73)
Normalisation .84 (.28) .16 (.55) .13 (75)**
Pre LOI-SF
Control .01 (.29) -.53 (.56) .08 (71)
Normalisation .05 (.28) -.53 (.56) .11 (73)*
Pre EBRIQ
Control -.31 (.29) .30 (.56) .08 (70)
Normalisation -.46 (.29) -.48 (.57) .14 (70)**
Pre AAQ
Control .09 (.29) -.43 (.58) .09 (67)
Normalisation -.16 (.30) -.24 (.58) .10 (66)
Post MCQ-30
Control .27 (.31) -.25 (.60) .10 (61)
Normalisation .76 (.31) .47 (.61) .11 (60)
Post LOI-SF
Control .14 (.31) -.17 (.62) .08 (58)
Normalisation .17 (.31) -.58 (.61) .09 (60)
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Measure Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (df)
Post EBRIQ
Control -.88 (.34) 1.10 (.67) .10 (48)
Normalisation -.54 (.31) -.58 (.61) .09 (60)**
Post AAQ
Control .13 (.33) -.22 (.64) .06 (53)
Normalisation .00 (.31) -.79 (.61) .10 (59)
Follow-up MCQ-30
Control .89 (.41) .30 (.81) .14 (32)
Normalisation .28 (.43) .93 (.85) .10 (29)
Follow-up LOI-SF
Control .05 (.43) -.16 (.83) .15 (30)
Normalisation .80 (.43) -.50 (.85) .20 (29)**
Follow-up EBRIQ
Control .54 (.43) -.67 (.83) .13 (30)
Normalisation -.73 (.44) -.15 (.86) .12 (28)
Follow-up AAQ
Control .02 (.43) -.24 (.83) .10 (30)
Normalisation .24 (.44) -.49 (.86) .09 (28)
* p < .05
** p < .005
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Appendix 13
Rank Analysis of Covariance
The following procedure was followed within SPSS to replicate the rank 
analysis of covariance (Quade, 1967):
1. All cases of the dependent variable (MCQ-30 total) were ranked.
2. A linear regression of the ranks of the dependent variable (post MCQ-30) 
on the ranks of the covariates (pre MCQ-30) was conducted. The residuals 
from this analysis were saved.
3. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the 
residuals (from the regression analysis in step 2) as the dependent variable, 
and condition as the independent variable. The F statistic provided a test of 
the difference between conditions on post MCQ-30 scores, controlling for pre 
MCQ-30 scores.
The difference in post MCQ-30 scores between the control normalisation 
conditions, controlling for pre MCQ-30 scores was non-significant F(119) = 
1.61, p = .207.
